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ABSTRACT
THE TURKISH STATE’S ECONOMIC DILEMMAS IN THE 1970s: 
THE ROAD TO THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION
Ö. Hakan Kök
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Meltem Müftüler Baç
September 1998
This thesis analyzes the military intervention of 1980 in Turkey with a 
special emphasis given to economic factors. In doing so, the thesis will 
utilize a model of bureaucratic authoritarianism with some examples 
from different Latin American countries. Therefore the thesis will 
question the role of economic factors in the rise of Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian State. In addition, an analysis of the January 24, 1980 
stabilisation measures will also be made within the framework of 
changing political economy of the country of post-1980 era.
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ÖZET
TÜRK DEVLETİNİN 1970li YILLARDAKİ EKONOMİK İKİLEMLERİ: 
1980 ASKERİ MÜDAHALESİNE GİDEN YOL
ö. Hakan Kök
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Meltem Müftüler Baç
Eylül 1998
Bu tez, Türkiye’deki 1980 askeri müdahalesini ekonomik 
faktörlere dayandırarak incelemeye ça lışm ıştır. Bunu yaparken 
de değişik Latin Amerika ülkelerinden örnekler vererek bürokratik 
otoriter devlet modelinden faydalanm ıştır. Böylece bürokratik 
otoriter devletin ortaya çıkış ındaki ekonomik faktörlerin rolünü 
sorgulamaya çalışm ıştır. Buna ilaveten, 1980 sonrası ülkenin 
değişen ekonomik koşulları çerçevesinde 24 Ocak 1980 
ekonomik istikrar tedbirlerinin bir incelemesi yap ılm ıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler : Bürokratik Otoriter Devlet, Ekonomik Kriz
IV
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my special gratitude to my supervisor 
Meltem Müftüler Baç for her valuable comments and for devoting 
her time throughout the preperation of this thesis. I owe also 
special thanks to Prof. Dr. Ergun özbudun and Ass. Prof. E. Fuat 
Keyman for their helpful comments.
To Ecem and Kaan
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT......................
ÖZET.................................
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Ill
. iv
. .V
.VI
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I: BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIAN STATE
AND INDUSTRIALISATION IN TURKEY..................................5
1.1 Bureaucratic Authoritarian ism .................................................6
1.2 A Comparison of Latin American and Turkish Case........16
1.3 Industria lisa tion......................................................................... 31
1.4 Import Substituting Industria lisation.....................................39
CHAPTER II: INDUSTRIALISATION CRISIS IN THE 
LATE SEVENTIES................................................... .46
2.1Characteristics of the Turkish Political System and
Politics from 1973 to 1980........................................................ 46
2.2 An Analysis of the Economic C ris is ....................................... 56
2.3 Exhaustion of ISI in Turkey......................................................80
VI
2.4 The Political and Economic Consequences of the
Crisis of Import S ubstitu tion...................................................90
CHAPTER III; THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION..................99
3.1 The 1980 M ilitary Intervention................................................99
3.2 The M ilitary ’s Role in the Turkish Economy.....................110
CHAPTER IV; RESTRUCTURING OF TURKISH ECONOMY
AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS................................... 120
4.1 The January 24, 1980 Economic Stabilization
M easures.................................................................................. 120
4.2 Political Im plications...............................................................134
CONCLUSION........................................................................................141
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................148
VII
INTRODUCTION
This thesis focuses on the military intervention of 1980 in 
Turkey. In doing so, a special emphasis will be given to economic 
background of the Turkish state and the state- industry relations 
in the late seventies.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop alternative 
approaches to political events such as military takeovers. The 
thesis proposes that the economic factors and the economic crisis 
in the seventies were important factors leading to the military 
takeover in Turkey on September 12, 1980. The political factors 
will neither be totally rejected nor denied. However, they will not 
be treated as primary factors in this thesis but rather they will be 
of secondary significance. My proposition is that the understand­
ing of the 1980 military takeover in Turkey necessitates a closer 
analysis of economic processes throughout the years preceding 
1980 coup d'etat.
In order to do so, the thesis will utilize a model of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism. The emergence of the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian State in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s 
had been linked to the failures in the implementation of economic 
policies such as import substitution industrialisation. In Latin 
American countries, balance of payment difficulties, large budget
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deficits and high rates of inflation combined with the political 
activation of popular classes strained the political system beyond 
its capacity. Consequently, the countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay which had similar industrialisation 
policies, yielded to military dictatorships throughout the seventies. 
Thus my second proposition which is interrelated to first one is to 
interpret the Turkish case in a similiar light. The politico-economic 
crisis mainly associated with import substitution industrialisation 
policies and state-industry relations first paved the way for the 
transformation of economic stabilization measures of January 24, 
1980 and then resulted in the military coup of September 12,
1980. Thus, I propose that a Bureaucratic Authoritarian State was 
established in Turkey between 1980 and 1983.
This thesis also questions the role of economic processes 
and/ or factors in the rise of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian State. I 
try to provide an explanation by elucidating another political 
phenomenon, state autonomy as a variable to contend with. The 
success of economic models regardless of their inward or outward 
orientation is mostly dependent on the existence of an autono­
mous state which is capable of undertaking the necessary 
initiatives to correct the economy’s inherent problems. Thus, state 
autonomy and economic crisis are interrelated in my analysis.
In the first chapter of this thesis I deal with the notion of 
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism as a model. This chapter also 
illustrates the Bureaucratic Authoritarianism as a political regime.
The theoretical basis comprises the works of such influential 
scholars as G. O’Donnell (1973, 1988), R. Dahl (1971), S. 
Huntington (1993), F. H. Cardoso (1979), T. S. Di Telia (1990). In 
the second part of this chapter, I make a comparison of Latin 
American case with Turkish case by an application of the process 
of industrialisation and its basic policies.
In the second chapter, I analyze the Turkish industrialisa­
tion crisis and the state building process and its crisis in Turkey in 
the late seventies. A brief summary of characteristics of Turkish 
political system and politics from 1973 to 1980 has been included 
in the beginning of this chapter in order to generate a clearer 
understanding Turkey’s political situation in that period.
In the third chapter, I deal with the Turkish military both as 
guardians of state and economic managers of the country. The 
purpose of the 1980 military intervention together with the 
military’s role in Turkish economic management have been the 
sensitive part of this section. Although the military’s foremost 
concern seems to be the restructuring of the political system, they 
have always played an active role in economic management, i.e. 
the formation of Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (known as 
OYAK) in 1961.
In the fourth and final chapter, restructuring of the Turkish 
economy and its political implications are addressed within the 
framework of political economy of the country of post-1980 era. 
The analysis of the January 24, 1980 stabilisation measures
constitute the core of this chapter. Since 1980, a new era began 
in Turkish political economy. This was possible with a 
transformation in the Turkish economy and a change from import 
substitution industrialisation inspired attitudes towards export 
oriented policies. A special emphasis is given to stabilisation 
measures with their political implications.
In short, the thesis focuses on the role of economic crisis; 
mainly the industrialisation crisis in the seventies; as the critical 
factor paving the road to the military takeover of September 12, 
1980. The resulting conclusion seems to be that despite all the 
emphasis on the breakdown of law and order, and the reign of 
anarchy; the Turkish State in the seventies was seriously 
threatened by its economic incapacities. The legitimacy crisis that 
the Turkish state faced in these years prevented the adoption of 
necessary measures, such as austerity and stabilization 
packages. The military rule from 1980 to 1983 provided a political 
environment that made these measures, previously impossible to 
adopt, viable. Thus, the Bureaucratic Authoritarian state that 
emerged after 1980 was a response to the economic crisis of the 
seventies.
CHAPTER I
BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIAN STATE AND 
INDUSTRIALISATION IN TURKEY
Turkish democracy was interrupted in 1980 by a military 
takeover and such interruptions had taken place before in 
1960 and 1970. The basic common denominator in all of the 
three interventions was that they firs tly  aimed to stop the 
political violence.
I propose that our understanding of the m ilitary 
interventions in Turkey would be enhanced by an analysis 
of economic processes, and state- industry relations. I 
argue that the breakdowns in Turkish democracy have 
resulted from failures in socio- economic life. Therefore, my 
thesis will focus on an economic oriented explanation for 
the 1980 m ilitary intervention, and political factors will be 
treated as supplemental.
One of the other alternative ways of explaining this 
breakdown would be the analysis of the situation in terms of 
purely political factors. Stepan and Linz (1978), have 
argued that breakdowns are due to political factors:
Breakdowns are not inevitable consequences of 
socio- economic factors, but rather they are due to 
purely political factors. Breakdowns are associated 
with certain attitudes of elites; more precisely, 
breakdowns are the outcomes of a combination 
between the polarization, fragmentation and 
degeneration of the system, and the failure of the 
state/ political elites to handle the crisis, before 
taking extreme forms.^
This thesis will analyze the 1980 m ilitary intervention 
with special emphasis on the economic circumstances and 
background in the late seventies. The politico- economic 
crisis during the 1970s firs t gave rise to the transform ation 
of economic relationships on January 24, 1980 and then 
culminated in September 12, 1980 m ilitary intervention 
which established a Bureaucratic Authoritarian state.^
In order to prove my points I will firs t deal with the 
application of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism  as a model in 
Turkey between 1980 and 1983.
1.1. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism  is a type of capita list 
state structure and the basic network of social relations in 
capita list societies. The relations in this type of society are 
motivated most importantly by production.
’ Juan J Linz and Alfred Stephan (eds.). The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes : Latin America. (Baltimore and London; The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1978), 23
 ^ Henri J. Barkey, The State and the Industrialisation Crisis in 
Turkey; (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford; Westview Press, 1990), 2
The state, as the guarantor of the capitalist relations 
of production, is a necessary and primordial part of 
these relations. In addition to guaranteeing their 
effectiveness and reproduction, the state also 
organizes the capita list relations of production by 
articulating and buffering the relationships among 
classes and by providing elements necessary to their 
normal unchallenged reproduction.^
It is important to understand that the state in this 
context is the guarantor not of the immediate interests of 
the bourgeoisie but organizes social relations in such a way 
that it leads to the emergence of bourgeoisie as a dominant 
class. In that sense, bureaucratic authoritarian state is 
where the bourgeoisie is a dominant class that organizes 
and guarantees capitalist relations of production. The 
working class is also crucial in this social organization. The 
members of the bourgeoisie class must place lim itations on 
their economic aspirations in order to prevent social and 
industrial unrest among the working class.
The Bureaucratic Authoritarian state tends to exclude 
class organizations from the decision- making process, pre­
serving a rigid hierarchical structure that is bureaucratically 
controlled by a various national security agencies and by 
the commanders of the armed forces.
^Guillermo O’Donnell, Bureaucratic A uth o r ita r ia n ism : 
Argentina. 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective rRprkPipy Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988), 2
* Fernando H. Cardoso, "On the Characterization of 
Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America” , in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, David Collier (ed.), (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1979), 36
Since the state is a part of society, in terms of social 
relations there has to be also a set of institutions in which 
social actors are the bearers of these social relations. The 
crucial role played by these actors is the restoration of the 
economy as well as the de-politic ization of the rest of 
society. Because, the state operates as the organizer of 
capita list society and acts as the guardian and agent of a 
general interest it seems to stand apart from society while it 
is in society.®
The term ‘bureaucratic’ suggests the crucial features 
that are specific to authoritarian systems. The bureaucrats, 
or people controlling executive positions in the state appa­
ratus, are also the ones who make decisions on who may or 
may not participate. The armed forces take power to re­
organize the nation in accordance with the ‘national 
security ’ ideology of modern m ilitary doctrine. Cardoso uses 
the term ‘Bureaucratic Authoritarianism ’ to refer only to the 
type of political regime and he limits it to regimes charac­
terized by institutional m ilitary rule. The army, as the 
guarantor of the authoritarian order, prefers a technical,
® Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernisation and Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism Studies in South American Politics. (Institute of 
International Studies, University of California Berkeley, 1973, 1979 
by the Regents of the University of California), 86
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supportive relationship between the state and social 
groups.®
C. Andrain argues a ‘between- system change’ emer­
ges when incumbent political leaders face severe conflicts 
or contradictions that they can not handle within the exist­
ing mode of policy production. Contradictions such as cul­
tural, structural, and policy eventually leads to system atic 
disintegration over the long run.^
For instance, when cultural contradictions become 
especially severe, the beliefs voiced by the ruling leaders 
no longer provide meaning to a society undergoing concep­
tual confusion; a gap arises between opposing values, 
which signals declining legitimacy. When the armed forces 
stage a coup d’état and institute a bureaucratic- 
authoritarian system, ideology usually assumes less 
importance as the primary reason for between-system 
change. The goals of economic growth, national security 
and political order take precedence over the need to 
transm it a comprehensive, systematic ideology to the
masses. 8
® Cardoso, “Authoritarian", 36
 ^ Charles Andrain, Political Change in the Third World. (Allen 
and Unwin Boston, 1988), 58
® Ibid., 62
The structural contradictions among the social groups, 
political organizations and foreign institutions also explain 
the probability of between-system change. If the incumbent 
regime becomes fragmented, can no longer either form an 
effective coalition among its allies or wield coercion against 
opponents, and loses support from foreign institutions, it 
will likely disintegrate. Three structures: domestic social 
groups, political organizations (governments, parties) and 
foreign institutions become crucial to systematic change.® 
Ineffective policy performance also underlie a trans­
form ation from one system to a different type.
If the incumbent government displays ineffective 
policy performance and the policy promises made by 
opposition leaders appeal to the disaffected, the 
likelihood of a systematic breakdown increases.^®
Ineffective policy performance refers to a gap between 
policy goals and actual results. For example, if the govern­
ment fails to lower inflation, decrease unemployment, 
achieve a higher economic growth, reduce violence, and 
lessen the inequalities separating the urban areas from the 
rural sector, aspiring elites may take actions to overthrow 
the existing government. When policy ineffectiveness 
combines with a disintegration of state power and loss of 
legitimacy the regime’s stability can be threatened. Under
® Ibid., 63 
Ibid., 64
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these conditions if the system disintegrates, most often 
bureaucratic authoritarian modes of political decision­
making become dominant, as happens when a m ilitary coup 
d’état causes the downfall of an elected civilian government. 
Especially in Latin America during the 1970s, the coups in 
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile represented the most notable 
examples.
Cardoso argues that the notion of bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism  should be used to situations in which 
m ilitary intervention occurred. In such situations, m ilitary 
regimes implement policies that serve to reorganize the 
state and the economy in a way to guarantee the continued 
advance of capitalist industrial development.^^
Bureaucratic- Authoritarian regimes organize the 
relations of power in favor of the executive by means of 
increased centralization. The relationship between the 
ruling elite and people living on fixed incomes such as 
workers and wage earners in general, in these regimes; the 
immediate effects of monetary stabilization policies 
implemented by the m ilitary after the takeover— normally 
after a period of political crisis, inflation, and economic 
uncertainty— clearly demonstrate that these groups have
”  Ibid., 68
Cardoso, “Authoritarian”, 38.
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not been taken into account. Whereas the alliances bet­
ween big capital and the state are implicit, bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism  rather becomes repressive and depresses 
the living standard of the workers and of the masses.
According to O’Donnell, the principal characteristics 
of a bureaucratic- authoritarian state may be summarized 
as fo llow s:’ '* first, it is fundam entally the aspect of global 
society that guarantees and organized domination exercised 
through a class structure subordinated to the upper fractions 
of a highly oligopolized and transnationalized bourgeoisie. 
The principle social base of the BA is this upper bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, on the institutional level, it is a set of organiza­
tions in which specialists have decisive weight in coercion 
to normalize the economy. The main tasks that the BA 
undertakes are the political deactivation of the popular 
sector, on the one hand, and the normalization of the 
economy, on the other. Thirdly, it is a system of political 
exclusion of a previously activated popular sector by 
coercion as well as by the destruction or strict governmental 
control of human and material resources. Fourthly, the 
suppression of citizenship and political participation is 
brought with this exclusion. The BA is thus based on the
Ibid., 50
’ ^O’Donnell, “Bureaucratic” , 31-32
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suppression of two fundamental mediations between state 
and society: citizenship and participation. Fifthly, it is also 
a system of economic exclusion of the popular sector, in as 
much as it promotes a pattern of capital accumulation which 
favors large government benefited units of private capital 
and some institutions. Sixth, it endeavors to de-politic ise 
social issues by dealing with them in terms of the 
supposedly neutral and objective criteria of technical 
rationality. Finally, it is a system in which the channels for 
the representation of popular and working class interests 
are closed. Access is limited to those who stand at the apex 
of the large organizations, especially the armed forces*, 
large enterprises and certain segments of the sta te ’s civil 
bureaucracy.
O’DonneM’s Figure 1— an adaptation of Robert Dahl’s 
model for the emergence of political systems— shows where 
the emergence of a Bureaucratic- Authoritarian political 
system is likely to occur.
My emphasis
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TIME I TIME II
MODERNISATION
FIGURE-1 Showing the emergence of
TIME
In Figure-1 up to the beginning of Time III, R. Dahl is 
proposing a model of emergence of political system as a 
function of decreasing costs of tolerance and increasing 
costs of suppression.^® As social d ifferentia tion proceeds 
with industrialization and subsequent social changes, more 
autonomous social groups appear, making it harder for the
Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposi-tion. (New 
Hayen; Yale Uniyersity Press, 1971), 15-16
16 O’Donnell, “Modernization", 85-86
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government to suppress them. At this stage a political 
system \A/hich accepts the legitimacy of divergent interests 
and actors, and regulates them peacefully, is likely to 
emerge. O’Donnell has extended this stage further to locate 
the emergence of a Bureaucratic Authoritarian political 
system. What we witness in developing countries is that 
with modernization (Time III), there is a steady increase in 
the cost of suppression resulting in social integration that 
falls behind, which finally results in praetorianism. The cost 
of toleration compared to early stages of modernization will 
rise even more rapidly since the suppression will be 
attempted at a much higher cost than at previous stages.
The levels of political activation are likely to increase with 
the increase in social differentiation and social d iffe ren tia­
tion is expressed by political pluralism/*®
Up to now, I have mentioned the bureaucratic- 
authoritarian state from the analytical point of view by 
examining the class concept, theoretical aspects and the 
relationship between the ruling elite and the upper and 
middle bourgeoisie and the working class. In the next section 
I will deal with some applications to Latin American and 
Turkish case.
Ibid., 86 
Ibid., 86-87
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1.2. The Comparison of Latin American and Turkish 
Case
To explain what the Bureaucratic- Authoritarian states 
established in Argentina in 1930 and in 1966; in Brazil in 
1964, and what the m ilitary sought to achieve in Turkey in 
1980 one should take a closer look at the Argentina 
example. One should keep in mind that regardless of the 
justification given for intervention, the m ilitary in various 
Latin American countries and in Turkey assumed the role of 
the “guardian” of the national interests under sim ilar 
conditions. The restoration of order in Latin American 
countries and in Turkey, despite economic and social 
differences, had sim ilar characteristics of the BA state. The 
restoration of order is the restoration of the economic 
policies followed by the previous civilian governments as 
well as the restoration of the economic structure. Even 
though the restoration of order embraces both the political 
and economic arena, it will be shown in the follow ing 
sections that one of the main reasons the army has taken 
control in Turkey was economic hardship faced by the 
country.
With the exception of some important d ifferentiation 
among them, the m ilitaries for the sim ilar reasons had
16
taken over the governments in Brazil (1964), in Chile and 
Uruguay (1973) and in Argentina (1930, 1966 and 1976).
In developing countries there is an explosive combina­
tion of high capacity to express demands, few resources 
and low legitimacy of allocation criteria. Huntington calls 
the result as “mass praetorianism ”. This ungovernability 
with the criteria of liberal pluralism and electoral competition 
leads to a search for new solutions, of a basically authorita­
rian character, to facilitate development and capital accumu­
lation. Di Telia argues that according to O’Donnell there are 
two kinds of sources for the spread of m ilitary “bureaucratic- 
authoritarian” regimes and he also claims that under the 
conditions of high modernization but not yet complete 
industrialization, authoritarian regimes would be the rule.^^ 
One reason for the emergence of authoritarian regimes is 
that there is a need, on the part of industrialists and 
adm inistrative elites, to strengthen labor discipline to make 
capital accumulation and advanced industria lization 
possible. A second, reason is to control freedom for the 
popular strata to organize because its potentially
19 O’Donnel, "Bureaucratic", 31-32
^°Torcuato S. Di Telia, Latin American Politics: A Theoretical 
Framework. (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990), 84
Ibid., 84
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revolutionary consequences are threatening to the dominant 
classes.
Di Telia also argues that although both Comte and 
Spencer placed a lot of faith in automatic market mechanism 
-  in their positivism and evolutionism concepts, respectively- 
to regulate some areas of social conflict, they were still 
concerned with the search for the consolidation of authority 
so as to “order” society in times of economic crisis and 
violence above the wills of in d iv id u a ls .H e  states that “a 
radical economic liberalism can coexist with considerable 
doses of authoritarianism  in political, cultural or ideological
_____ ” 23areas.
In 1930s, in Argentina the armed forces, in collaboration 
with civilians and with the apparent support of the populace, 
pulled of a m ilitary coup, and Argentinean democracy was 
o v e r t h r o w n . O n e  of the standard explanations for the 
collapse of Argentinean democracy maintains that the world­
wide depression threw the country’s vulnerable export- 
import economy into a downward spiral which, in turn, 
discredited the Yrigoyen r e g i m e . T h e  m ilitary was 
prompted to act in the name of efficiency and economic
Ibid., 49 
Ibid., 49
24 Linz and Stepan (eds.), "Breakdown", 3-4 
Ibid., 5
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recovery. This argument finds support in a sudden decline 
in GNP per capita between 1929 and 1930. Also Figure-2 
shows this decline in per capita Gross National Product 
(GNP), between the years 1914 and 1932.
TDD·:
600 ■p
500’
I
400-
300^
200-p 
100-
0^-
1914 1916 1918 1SB0 1GE2 1SB4 1SEB 1SBB 1900 1902
SOURCE; United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, 
El desarrollo económico de la Argentina, mimeographed (Santiago de 
Chile, 1958), E/CN. 12/429, Add. 4, p. 4.
FIGURE- 2 GNP per capita in Argentina (1914-1932) 26
Stepan and Linz (1978), argue that this data would 
have served better for an economic cause of the revolt if it 
had taken place in 1931 or in 1932 where GNP was at its 
l o w e s t . A n o t h e r  sim ilar idea is that since income distribu­
tion is unequal, poverty in the lower and middle class would 
persist even when GNP increases.For instance, in Argentina, 
between 1925 and 1929 when GNP rose countrywide, the 
fact that poverty continued should not be disregarded.
26
27
Ibid., 5 
Ibid., 5
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During the period of democratic politics, real wages are at 
their lowest and strikes were frequent from 1918 to 1920. In 
1918-1920, even though the GNP was increasing nominally, 
it was not distributed evenly. Low real wages coupled with 
strikes causing economic crisis and thus a coup d ’etat was 
not considered by the government.^®
In Argentina, a series of conferences were held bet­
ween 1942 and 1945 by the Union Industrial Argentina. The 
participation of m ilitary in these conferences allowed a con­
vergence between the m ilitary and industry. According to Di 
Telia, Colonel Manuel Savio who was one of the firs t to be 
invited to these conferences urged his audience to accept 
state intervention in planning the economy, because “the 
worst aspect of the postwar is economic c h a o s . A l s o  the 
president of Union Industrial Argentina and Leopoldo Meló, 
deputy of the right wing of the Radical Party, both were 
concerned with the period due to foreseeable economic 
chaos, which “might make more victims than the war itse lf” 
and generate vast numbers of unemployed.®®
Again in Argentina, on 28 June 1966, the army once 
more took over the government. M ilitary officers “acting as 
representatives of the armed forces” ousted Arturo lllia, the
Ibid., 7
^®Di Telia, “Framework". 91-92
30 Ibid., 92
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constitutionally elected president of A r g e n t i n a . T h e  
political parties were dissolved and all their activities were 
banned. The leader of the new junta formed right after the 
coup, stated the reasons for the coup. The most important 
of these were:^^ first, the inability of previous civilian 
governments to solve the national problems of economic 
stagnation, inflation, lack of authority, widespread social 
unrest and loss of international prestige. Second, the lack 
of harmony and solidarity in and among the major social 
groups, which had led to anarchy, subversion and neglect 
of the public interest. Third, the irresponsible behaviour of 
political parties, which had led to polarization of public 
opinion and inefficient governmental performance, and 
fourth, the unrepresentativeness of the leadership of the 
political parties and of most organized groups.
The intensity of internal conflicts in Latin American 
societies is such that pressures to and from the barracks 
are uncontrollable. And the demand for the m ilitary to play 
a “m oderating” role comes from civil s o c i e t y . I n  Brazil, 
m ilitary ’s “moderating” role involved several short-lived 
interventions until 1964 when the m ilitary introduced a new
Linz and Stepan (eds.), “Breakdown", 138 
Ibid., 138-139
“  Di Telia, “Framework” , 94
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type of intervention called “transform ative” . A sim ilar s itua­
tion also developed in 1966 in Argentina with the Ongania 
m ilitary coup and in 1976 under General Videla after a short 
intermission.^'‘The”transform ative” intervention is characterized 
by the menace against the m ilitary institutions, the duration 
of the m ilitary in power and by the support from the business 
and conservative sectors.
The importance of the June 1966 coup is that it was a 
conscious effort by the m ilitary to change the existing po liti­
cal system to a bureaucratic authoritarian regime.^® One of 
the most important reasons noted above was economic 
stagnation and inflation resulting from the inability of the 
civilian governments before June 1966 to stabilize the 
economy. Economic failures may depend on several factors 
such as lack of authority or lack of harmony between social 
groups. Nevertheless, they were crucial reasons accounting 
for the 1966 coup in Argentina.
Also the m ilitary coup in Argentina in 1930 was said 
to be the outcome of series of economic defaults. The 
radicals’ governments were not free of fraud and arbitrary 
interventions of the central government into the states 
affairs. According to Stephan and Linz (1978), it was
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particularly unfortunate for Argentina that the British
economy began to decline after 1914.^®
Because of the decline in the British economy after
1914 .............economic growth slowed, and finally
with the impact of the world crisis began in 1929, the 
economic situation became very serious. The new 
established m ilitary adm inistration undertook a 
program of industrialization designed to save badly 
needed international currency and provide an internal 
market for agrarian production.®^
In 1966 the average per capita income [in Argentina]
was $818. In 1960 unionized workers numbered around
2.600.000. Agricultural and industry accounted for 16.6 and
34.0 per cent respectively of the GNP while 21.4 per cent of 
the working age population was employed in agriculture and
28.0 per cent in industry.The economic situation in Argentina 
until the end of 1964 was in a smooth and slow period of 
growth. However, a dramatic change has been observed in 
1965 and in 1966 with an inflation rate increasing by more 
than 10 per cent from 22.1 per cent to 32.3 per cent and by 
a growth rate from 6.7 per cent to minus 2.4 per cent. An 
important effect of inflation and devaluation was a wild 
fluctuation in income distribution. The wrong economic 
policies meant severe income losses for the urban industrial 
sector, which resulted in intense social conflict.®®
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...by promoting social unrest as well as by paralyzing 
production through strikes and the occupation of 
factories they -  workers and-or unions -  could make a 
government appear unable to maintain even minimal 
levels of law and order, and thus put it in immediate 
danger of being ousted.^®
The bureaucratic authoritarian regimes formed right 
after the m ilitary interventions that took place in Argentina 
can be regarded largely as the results of an economic 
crisis. Of course social and economic crisis as well as the 
weakening of sta te ’s autonomy and its inability to produce 
more rational policies linked to the country’s economic 
situation play an important role in the degeneration of the 
political system and in the possible coup d ’etat. O’Donnell 
argues that the m ilitary intervenes to achieve three 
objectives:'’® the first of these objectives is to deepen the 
industrial structure by instituting new economic policies. 
These measures involve increased investments in capital 
goods industries and the implementation of more orthodox 
economic prescriptions, such as devaluation, tightening of 
money and credit. Second, bureaucratic authoritarian states 
also work to achieve domestic stability, which had been 
endangered by the stagnating economy unable to cope with 
the demands from below. Third, bureaucratic authoritarian 
states also aim at the economic exclusion of the popular
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classes and incorporate in the higher echelons of the 
government former members of the armed forces and public 
and private bureaucracies.
More importantly, Barkey highlights these findings by 
quoting Hirschman:
the economic problems of which the policy and coup 
makers were most conscious were, first, inflation and 
second balance of payments disequilibrium  especially 
when foreign exchange reserves were threatening to 
run out. Those who were responsible for turning Latin 
American politics in the authoritarian d irection.........
In Turkey, the role of the m ilitary as the “guardian” of 
the state and of civil society has continued since 1960 m ili­
tary intervention. Therefore, m ilitary involvement in politics 
is a fam iliar feature of Turkish life as it has been in Latin 
American. In Turkey, the military, even when not ruling 
directly, often exert its existence and influence on civil 
authorities. For example, during the rule of the W elfare 
Party and True Path Party coalition government, in 
February 1997, the armed forces command ordered tanks 
into the streets of Sincan, an outer Ankara suburb following 
an alleged anti-secular demonstration organized by the 
m unicipality. The m ilitary has always been a persistent and 
sustainable part of Turkish society and culture sim ilar to 
Argentina and other Latin American countries such as
41 Ibid., 15-16
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Brazil, Chile. The m ilitarization in Turkish republican history 
began with the 27 May 1960 coup and since then the armed 
forces have always been important players of political 
games. What has started as occasional interventions by the 
Turkish Armed Forces seems to end in the transform ation of 
role of the m ilitary from an intervenor to an active player in 
the political arena. Even in ordinary situations, the army 
has become an indispensable element of political life.'’  ^ The 
role of the m ilitary in Turkish politics is also institutionalized 
by Turkish constitutions. According to Samuel Hungtington, 
m ilitary regimes generally look for the creation of some 
“exit-guarantees” which would be institutionalized in the 
constitution.'*^
In Turkey, the 1980 m ilitary intervention may be re­
garded as “transform ative” when compared to 1960 and 
1971 interventions since the duration of the m ilitary in 
power lasted much longer (more than three years). There 
was also an increasing level of menace against the m ilitary 
institutions and it was also supported by the various 
segments of the society (especially by the middle class). 
José Nun, argues that the armed forces should be
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considered as an organized expression of the middle 
classes, not because their social origins are similar, but 
because both are interested in the maintenance of the 
social order. He is against those who consider the middle 
classes to be carriers of democratization. The middle class 
adopts democratic mentality only at the early stages of 
economic development.^^ On the other hand, such scholars 
as Alfred Stepan reject the idea that the m ilitary is the 
natural representative of the middle classes. In his view, 
the armed forces intervene only when they feel themselves 
threatened in their own institutional integrity and thus they 
act to transform those conditions from which such menace 
arises.·*^
After the 1980 coup d ’éta t,the Turkish military followed 
an oppressive and exclusionist program of deactivating the 
popular sectors of the Turkish society in order to achieve 
the restoration of order and the normalization of the political 
situation. This included the banning of all political parties, 
the arrest of the political party leaders, bans on the activ i­
ties of interest groups and the closure of various unions. 
These actions perfectly suit the BA model of O’Donnell 
because: “bureaucratic- authoritarianism  is a system of
45
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political exclusion of a previously activated popular 
secto r,...” ®^ After the 1980 Turkish m ilitary intervention the 
people who controlled the executive positions in the state 
apparatus and at the institutional level were either those 
who staged the coup -  the members of the National 
Security Council -  or those especially chosen by the 
members of NSC. After the m ilitary intervention m ilitary 
took over the government by establishing an organ, NSC 
which consisted of the four commanders of Armed Forces 
and Chief of Staff. For example, the National Security 
Council chose professors from various Turkish universities 
to prepare the 1982 Constitution in accordance with the 
m ilita ry ’s expectations. NSC was the main body who had 
decided on who may or may not participate in the decision 
making process. The m ilitary had also forbidden discussions 
concerning the new constitution during the period of its 
preparation (1981-1982), fearing that this would influence 
people before where the constitution was to be approved. 
The m ilitary continued this prohibition of discussions even 
during the period of the presentation of the new constitution 
in the media and the visits of Kenan Evren in various parts 
of the country. This was certainly not a very democratic
46 O'Donnell, “Bureaucratic” , 32
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environment for a “democratic" constitu tion /^ Also the 
provisional Article 9 of the Constitution expresses the fact 
that the m ilitary in Turkey had behaved very careful in 
transition to civilian politics which would be under their 
control until they were sure that their expectations for the 
future had been met.
.......... Within a period of six years following the
formation of the Bureau of the Grand National
Assembly (GNA) of Turkey............. the President of
the Republic may refer to the GNA of Turkey for 
further consideration any Constitutional amendments 
adopted by the Assembly. In this case the resubmis­
sion of the Constitutional amendment draft is its 
unchanged form to the President of the Republic by 
the GNA of Turkey, is only possible with a three 
fourths majority of the votes of the total number of 
members.'*®
In Latin America m ilitary governments have generally 
agreed to withdraw from power only in exchange for certain 
guarantees.'*® They make efforts to fix the rule.s of the game 
-  not so much different than the counterparts in Turkey - .  
When the situation permits it, they do not hesitate to 
demand a place for the military institutions in a democratic 
constitutional order that enables them to exercise a 
permanent right of supervision over political decisions.
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In Turkey, a strong centralist state and elite tradition inherited 
from the Ottoman Empire and dominated heavily by a 
“bureaucratic” structure and culture, have exercised strong 
effects on the developments and consolidation of democratic 
p o lic ie s .B u re a u c ra c y  -de fined  also as elite coalition by 
some scholars -a im ed to protect and perpetuate the state 
from the T anz im a t’ era to the Republic.
When Turkey is compared to Latin American countries, 
some fundamental differences can be observed.For 
example, human rights violations are not as serious as 
Latin American cases. For instance, use of violence by the 
Bolivian m ilitary regime between 1979 and 1982 resorted to 
numerous armed confrontations in the cities measured in 
terms of death, casualties and imprisonment.®^ Di Telia 
explains the use of violence due to lack of legitimacy and to 
factional infighting within the ruling circles. None of these 
can be said to exist in Turkish case. As for Argentina, 
General Juan Carlos Ongania’s government (1966-1970) 
started with a considerable repression, but low level of 
violence. By contrast, the takeover in 1976 by a new faction 
of the m ilitary started out with strong repression and
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v io le n c e . In  addition, the duration of Turkish m ilitary rule 
was short when compared to many Latin American cases 
such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. The effective 
factor for the short stay of the Turkish army as a direct 
ruling agent was being a member of NATO and of other 
international organizations and also having problematic 
relationships with her neighbours.®^ Since the Turkish army 
had to perform an external as well as internal role and 
because of Turkey’s international commitments, the m ilitary 
did not retain power. Especially being an ally to NATO was 
a catalyzing factor for moderating the army’s behaviour.®'*
A journalist from Latin America summarizes the Latin 
Am ericans’ “tragedy" by the words: “ in democracy the 
demand is easy and the answer is d ifficu lt.” In Turkish 
democracy, the demand is also easy but the answer is not 
as easy as the demands are.
1.3 Industrialization
Industrial development is distinguished by Z. Slawinsky 
in five stages of which the fifth is represented by more 
advanced economies.®® Some notable features of the fourth
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stage are: The production of special steels, the creation of 
petrochemical industries, the production of synthetic
chem icals...... and in general the production of higher
caliber machines and equipment of complex design manu­
factured or assembled by complex processes.®® The third 
stage is characterized by the emergence and development 
of the steel industry, and by petroleum refining and the 
development of basic chemical industry with the production 
of simple chemical products.®^ Educational institutions are 
the main suppliers of the skill inputs required at different 
levels of industrialization.®®
In the Turkish case, the socio-economic and political 
conditions have been considered to be sim ilar to those of 
Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile to the extend that economic collapse resulting m ilitary 
coups is a characteristics of the exhaustion of ISI after 
easy stages of import substitution.
Barkey’s argument is that Import Substitution 
Industria lization— the expansion of industrial production to 
supply a domestic market previously supplied by imported 
goods— itself is not responsible for the failure of Turkey’s 
industrialization efforts but rather it is the politicians who
“  Ibid., 36-38 
Ibid., 38
58 Ibid., 41
32
are responsible for the non-implementation of economic 
development.®® One of the other reasons for the failure of 
economic development is the lack of or absence of authority 
in the state. The absence of authority in state affairs 
resulted in not achieving the goals of industrialization 
efforts.®®
The success of industrialization is influenced by two 
factors: timing and the political economic context.®^ Timing, 
in turn, also influences the political and economic environ­
ment meaning that societies have to contend with different 
forms of external competition and domestic political structures. 
G erschenkron’s main contribution is that the more backward 
the country’s economy, the more would it be controlled and 
led by the state. He has argued that as the county’s economy 
is more backward its industrialization is more likely to; ®^
1. Start discontinuously in a sudden great spurt,
2. Rely on larger plants,
3. Emphasize investment rather than consumer goods,
4. Divert resources away from consumption.
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5. Rely on “special institu tions” to aid in raising capital for 
new industries and,
6. Rely less on the agricultural sector to provide it with 
surplus labour.
From a politico-econom ic perspective, the most inte­
resting of the above propositions is undoubtedly that 
concerning the role of “special institu tions”.®^  Those special 
institutions played different roles in the development of 
countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Russia. For 
instance in France and in Germany banks played a major 
role in mobilizing capital for the industrial sector.®^ In 
Russia, at the end of 19th century, the state ’s primary 
motive was to enhance its m ilitary strength for which it 
needed to industrialize.®® In contrast , during Ottoman 
period there were no serious attempts to industrialize, just 
the opposite, “ ....the Ottoman state hampered the growth of 
commerce and industry during most of the Empire’s existence.”®® 
During the first years of the Republic, issues of 
political economy in general played a minor role. The 
Kemalist regime was primarily concerned with instituting 
political and social reforms, such as the establishm ent of
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secular institutions and the adoption of Latin script. Turkey 
had to rely on imports to satisfy its needs for manufactured 
goods. A fter the Great Depression of 1929 the impact of the 
crash was fe lt both on exports and imports. With the decline 
in the price of basic agricultural commodities which was 
Turkey’s main source of foreign exchange, the government 
had to curtail imports. Atatürk and his associates approac­
hed the economic crisis with Etatist policies. The authoritarian 
one party state was well suited to their purposes.®^ These 
policies continued until the final blow came to Etatism with 
the Republicans’ decisive defeat in the general elections of 
1950.The strengthening of the political center which was 
the most important result of Etatism continued after the 
collapse with a great deal of influence on the society and 
its economy.®®
The initial period of Democratic rule(1950-1960) was 
characterized by high growth rates. On the industrial front, 
the relaxation of import restrictions and government encou­
ragement accelerated production. The rising consumption 
levels also pushed the manufacturing sector into establishing 
consumer goods industries.
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The Democrats’ attempts to expand the output of 
agriculture and their investments on infrastructure led to 
fiscal deficits which had to be financed by borrowing from 
domestic and external s o u rc e s .B y  1958 Turkey was
unable to borrow any funds from abroad, and US aid. A
stabilization program was announced in August 1958 which
included a devaluation of lira and the liberalization of the
import regime. As the m ilitary intervened to remove Democrats
from power on May 27, 1960, they were not able to see
whether or not their economic program would succeed.'’®
In the 1960s and 1970s, in Turkey, the accepted mode of
industrialization was Import Substitution Industrialization. The lack
of a strong and competitive private sector was one of the
reasons of Turkey’s late industrialization and poor economic
growth. Problems arose due to the fact that the government
had to play a direct role in the Turkish economy.
............[the] private sector was not strong or diverse
enough to sustain and industrialization drive, the 
state played a more direct role in creating the 
conditions and infrastructure for industria lization. 
Turkey was such a case, whereas Argentina and 
Brazil had fairly well-developed private sectors, 
Turkey’s was non-existent.^
In the industrialization of a country, the most impor­
tant duty belongs to the private sectors in that country. If
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state led understanding is dominant in the economy of a 
country and if government and its economy are interlocked, 
then this leads to a retarded industrialization. In Turkey, 
serious economic crises had taken place due to the state ’s 
direct role in the industrialization process which had 
undermined the regime’s existence that ended in m ilitary 
interventions. Government participation in the economy as 
measured by the shares of government expenditures and 
investments in GNP created attention between the private 
and public sectors.
Turkey has been unable to redress the imbalances in 
its economy and had to contend with severe economic 
crises. The culmination of these crises was often 
marked by m ilitary interventions attempting to 
accomplish what civilian politicians could not.^^
O’Donnell argues that:
if the external bottlenecks that limited the growth of
the national e co no m y........were exacerbated by
acute inflationary problems and if these contributed to 
an increasingly acute socio-political crisis, then the 
next step in the development process had to have one 
central goal: the domestic production of those goods 
(industrial inputs, capital goods) the imports of which 
had increased so rap id ly .^
At the end of 1970’s, Turkey was faced with a national 
economy that was not growing. One reason for slow 
economic growth is that the deepening of industrialization -
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expansion of industrial production beyond consumer goods 
to include the intermediate and capital goods used in the 
production process - could not be implemented/® What we 
mean by intermediate goods is the inputs used in industrial 
production such as fuels, metals and petrochemicals.
Capital goods refer to machinery and equipment used in 
industrial production. Deepening of industrialization is the 
responsibility of multinational corporations and would 
require/® first, large organizations that are financially 
capable of waiting for long periods for the maturation of their 
investments: second, a complex process of modification of 
the manufacture of finished industrial products due to the 
fact that the inputs and equipment employed in the manu­
facture of these products will be supplied by the new 
industries created by deepening: and third, guaranteed 
stability in some of the institutional mechanisms such as 
exchange rates.
However, between 1970-1975 Turkey was confronted 
with many urgent social problems with her 2.5 per cent 
population growth and 4.2 per cent urbanization rate.^^ In 
1975, 51 per cent of the population was under the age of
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19; 42 per cent of the population was living in urban areas. 
Unemployment rate among young workers was always at a 
high le v e l.R e g io n a l inequality, and distribution of the 
benefits of economic growth mainly to Istanbul and other 
western cities was creating a reactionary movement in 
Anatolian towns. Economic deprivation acted as one factor 
provoking ethnic and religious conflicts.^® The d ifficu lty of 
restructuring in industry was a basic characteristic of the 
depression at the end of the 1970s. To maintain an indust­
rialization growth pace which can be compared to the one 
maintained in the last decade, intermediate goods and 
capital goods should have increased as much as an increase 
in GNP.®° These sim ilar severe conditions continued 
increasingly especially with the exhaustion of ISI in Turkey. 
ISI and its exhaustion will be dealt in the next part of this 
thesis, in more detail.
1.4. Import Substitution Industrialization
The basic idea behind the concept of import substitu­
tion industrialization is to build up your own domestic mar­
ket and infant industries. Although ISI policies in Turkey 
were adopted in the 1930s they became the officia l
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instrument for economic development in the industria liza­
tion process following the 1960 m ilitary intervention.®^ The 
purpose of the use of ISI as a tool for economic development 
did not d iffer in Turkey from that of Latin American countries. 
By dom estically manufacturing previously imported simple 
consumer goods, the country could achieve two desirable 
aims: first, it could save the foreign exchange which was 
previously expended to purchase such goods, and secondly 
it could simultaneously provide an impetus for the develop­
ment of an industrial base. Some other crucial reasons may 
also be enumerated as follows; first, it contributes to the 
solution of the chronic balance of payment problems.Second, 
it increases the import capacity by saving foreign exchange. 
Third, it develops domestic industries and leads the eco­
nomy’s vertical integration and fourth, it increases available 
technology and know-how plus to expand employment 
countrywide.
The role of the state in Turkey after the 1960 m ilitary 
intervention was to encourage and help import substitution. 
According to §enses, in Turkey during 1970 and 1973 there 
were some short-lived attempts at foreign trade liberalization.
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trade and industrialization policies.®^ The following years 
after 1973 were characterized by import-substituting indust­
rialization under heavy protection.®“* The main instruments 
used by the state during this period were overvalued 
exchange rates, quantitative restrictions -quotas-and direct 
prohibitions of imports, a strict system of exchange control, 
high tariffs together with a variety of tax and credit incentives 
for manufacturing investment.®® Barriers to trade can be 
grouped into two categories; the one is tariff barriers while the 
other being non-tariff barriers. Tariff barriers are monetary 
measures whereas quotas, health and technical standards 
are non-tariff barriers. While tariffs generally increase the 
cost of an imported commodity immediately at the point of 
entry, quotas, by comparison restrict import quantities. 
Quotas reduce competition and indirectly affect the domestic 
price of imports. Also overvalued exchange rates, being an 
instrument available to governments, can be targeted to 
reduce the cost of intermediate and capital goods imports.®® 
Senses defines other forms of state intervention as follows:
®^Fikret §enses, "The Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment 
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the maintenance of negative real rates of interest, the 
tendency to control the prices of State Economic 
Enterprises to assist other sectors and the use of 
these enterprises as ‘the employer of last resort’ , 
were instrumental in reinforcing this pattern.®^
Hirschman defines easy phase of import substitution
as “the rapid expansion of consumer goods production
which may occur when this production is aimed at satisfying
an already existing domestic market that is newly protected
by the imposition of tariffs or import controls and/or by the
collapse of foreign trade.’’®® With the completion of initial
phase or easy phase of import substitution, the domestic
market becomes fully satisfied and seeks no more of the
commodities which were previously supplied. The early
stages of ISI are rather easy stages since they include the
development of light industries under heavy protection -
such as quotas, tariffs and exchange rate controls -  of the
state, when compared to the final stages of ISI. In the final
stages the aim is to have all the stages developed within
the country. For instance, it aims to produce starting right
from the raw materials up to the final product. This also
includes the development of intermediate goods plus
capital goods industries such as steel and machinery. This
stage also requires the deepening of industrialization and it
is a necessary step to become truly industrialized in the
87 Çenses (ed.), “Recent” , 52
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long run.®® Deepening -  the final stages of ISI -  does not 
simply involve any change in a capitalist economy, but 
instead involves the achievement of a higher degree of 
vertical integration of the private sector.®® Thus, deepening 
was necessary for the very survival of capitalism because 
of the problem of external bottlenecks such as balance of 
payment difficulties.
During the 1970s, in Turkey a concentration on 
production for the domestic market also gave the support of 
the industrialists to the populist governments. The populist 
policies of these governments contributed to the failure of 
ISI in Turkey by not emphasizing the deepening as 
mentioned by O’Donnell. Turkey’s major problem was that 
ISI was not fully implemented and lived its natural life 
course. In the political arena, the losers of the economic 
rent- seeking competition transferred their loss to the whole 
society with the help of these populist policies.®^ One of the 
crucial populist policies was to transfer the industria lis ts ’ 
loss to the whole society using the state’s compensation. 
Loser in the competition for rents always know that they 
can demand compensation from the state. When the loser is
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compensated for the cost of a particular group’s rent- 
seeking activities, the loss has been transferred to the 
society as a whole. Transfer payments, such as agricultural 
support payments are the examples of state compensation. 
Under such circumstances, rents can be said to have been 
s o c ia liz e d .S o , the sta te ’s compensation was one of the 
major tools in socializing the industria lists ’ loss. When the 
sta te ’s limits are reached to the end in the socialization 
process due to the limited number of available rents, the 
state, then faces with a legitimacy crisis. Crisis can be 
described as instances when the cost of rent seeking can 
no longer be s o c ia liz e d .F o llo w in g  a legitimacy crisis, the 
state then comes across with the problem of keeping its 
authority. In Turkey, as the crisis deepened, the state found 
itse lf weaker rather than s t r o n g e r . I n  order not to lose its 
authority completely in the end, the state reinforces its 
authoritarianistic character and becomes more centralized 
to regain its legitimacy. In open and competing political 
systems, if the state becomes unable to preserve its 
autonomy, political parties and other forms of represen­
tation of the differentiated societal interests constitute a
Ibid., 26 
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dangerous f o r c e . T h e  end of 1970s, in Turkey was the 
period where the state authority was weakened deeply and 
exhausted at the last point. A crisis situation was evident in 
rising inflation and balance of payment difficu lties, making 
an erosion on the authority and viability of populist 
governments.
In the next chapter I will analyze the crisis of 
industrialization and state building process in Turkey 
in the late seventies. A detailed analysis of economic 
crisis will also be made together with political 
consequences.
95 Ibid., 26-27
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CHAPTER II
INDUSTRIALISATION CRISIS IN THE LATE
SEVENTIES
2.1 Characteristics of The Turkish Political System and 
Politics from 1973 to 1980
Up to now, I have tried to explain a basic model of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism , the interplay of economic 
and political factors in bringing systematic breakdown. This 
chapter will analyze the industrialization crisis in Turkey in 
the 1970s and it will also identify the crisis at Turkish 
politics with an analysis of elections and political changes.
In the 1970s, there were some basic illnesses of the 
Turkish political system which I believe still exist even 
today. Those illnesses may be summarized as follows: 
volatility, expressed by the change in the patterns of party 
support, fragmentation and polarization.
From 1973 and onwards polarization in the political 
sphere plus within various groups as well as ideological 
fragmentation with de-elitization of the state were the 
important aspects of the political situation in Turkey.
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The political and economic instabilities and the 
problems which arose as a result of the failure in the 
industrialization mechanisms coming after the exhaustion of 
the ISI should be considered as the main consequence of 
the crisis. Polarization and fragmentation of the political 
system, in Turkey, was accompanied by a wave of terrorism 
and violence which led to the breakdown of law and order 
particularly in the police-forces, universities and in almost 
every other institution.
According to Erguder and Hofferbert, vo latility was 
one manifestation of the “Bermuda Triangle” through which 
Turkish democracy struggled in the 1970s.®® Linked to 
vo la tility  were fragmentation and polarization, especially 
among the governing elites. Changing of the Turkish 
parliamentary system from a “predominant party system ” to 
a hybrid between “moderate” and “polarized pluralism" was 
one of the major developments to explain increased
instability 97
The instability of political parties at the local, national 
and parliamentary level...was compounded by two 
other factors. First, political parties functioned 
primarily as clientelistic networks through which 
benefits driving from being in government would be 
distributed. Opposition parties, in this context were
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only rival c liente listic networks eager to come into 
power.
“The Notion of Patronage” in that sense, became one 
of the most important problems of the Turkish political 
system, putting emphasis on the redistribution of the 
resources to the clients of the political parties. Clients were 
of two categories; one was that the supporters of a specific 
political party and the other potential supporters. In order to 
maximize their support, each party attempted to enlarge its 
own cliente listic networks. To this end, some parties 
worked to create new associations under their domination. 
To cite an example, two new national federations of labor 
were created; one by the National Salvation Party and the 
other by the Nationalist Action Party in the early 1970s.
Each of these unions had official backing from these parties 
when they shared power in coalition governments so that 
these two parties might both possess their own instruments 
for establishing linkages with labor.
The second factor which effected the instability of 
political parties was that during the 1961-1980 period 
Turkey experienced a significant process of social transfor­
mation characterized by rapid urbanization, industrialization
liter Turan, “Political Parties and the Party System in Post- 
1983 Turkey", in The State. Democracy and the Military : Turkey in 
the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin(eds.), (Berlin, New York: 
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and the expansion of the market economy. Increasing so­
cietal differentiation complicated the job of political parties 
in aggregating i n t e r e s t s . N e w  parties with divergent 
ideologies came into being to capture the preferences of 
disaffected constituencies. The groups which established 
new parties and those who supported them expected to 
become integrated into cliente list networks through which 
they could enjoy public patronage. Furthermore, from 1973 
and onwards the cMentelistic networks which the major 
parties such as the Republican People’s Party and the 
Justice Party possessed were highly sophisticated and 
broadly based, bringing together leaders of occupational 
groups, labor, business and other organized interests.
The second major development, in the 1970s, was the 
change in patterns of party support prompting both to label 
the 1970s as “cri t ical” . T h e  “predominant party system ” 
classification seems to fit the Turkish case in the period 
that started with the elections of 1950 and ended with the 
JP’S worst performance in the 1973 elections. The JP, in 
these elections, received only 30 per cent of the votes —  a 
decrease from 46.5 per cent to 30 per cent compared to 
1969 election —  whereas the RPP did much better with an
Ibid., 65 
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increase from 27.4 per cent to 33.3 per cent. In “moderate 
pluralism ” the system is centre-oriented in the sense that 
support for ideological poles is weak, both in terms of elec­
toral support and parliamentary representation, and it is 
characterized by alternative coalitions of governmental power 
revolving around two major parties, as in West Germany of 
1 9 8 0 s.^°^However the Turkish party system of the 1970s 
performed much like “polarised p lu ra lis t” systems, or 
“extreme m ulti-party” system as defined by Sartori.^“"*
Polarization came to characterize not only the parties, but 
important social sectors as well, including organized labor, 
the teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy and even the 
police. At the same time, extremist m ilitants were engaged 
in escalating waves of violence. F*olitical assassinations were 
directed against members of parliament, prominent journalists 
and university professors. Some of the victims were extremists 
of left or right but others, particularly among the journalists 
and professors were exceptional moderates.These assassinations 
were clearly designed to undermine the political center and 
accelerate the process of polarization.^“®
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After the elections held on October 1973, none of the 
existing parties won a majority and the RPP of Ecevit emerged as 
the only strong party. The first coalition government was formed 
between the ultraconservative NSP of Erbakan and the RPP 
between September and October 1973. This coalition government 
lasted until the Ecevit’s resignation on September 1974 due to 
vast differences in the policies of the two parties. After a few 
months, in 1975, the second coalition government, which lasted 
until 1977, was formed and labeled as the first “Nationalist Front” 
between the right wing parties; JP, RRP, NSP and NAP.
Table -1  Party Performance in Turkish National 
Assembly Elections (1969-1977)^°®
1969 1973 1977
Party
Justice
Republican
People's
National
Salvation
Nationalist
Action
Minor
Personalistic 
Minor Left **
%Vote Seats %Vote Seats VoVote Seats
46,5 256 29.7 14S 36.9 189
27.4 143 33.3 185 41.4 213
. . . . . . 11.8 48 8.6 24
3.2 1 3.4 3 6.4 16
. . . . . . 5.3 65 1.9 . . .
5.5 10 — ___ 0.5 __
* Republican Reliance Party, Republican Peasants’ Nation Party, 
Democratic Party, Nation Party, New Turkey Party, Independents 
·* Turkish Union Party and Turkish Labor Party together
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When the election results of 1973 are compared to 
that of 1977, it seems that the JP and the RPP, had 
increased their share of the total vote. The JP increased its 
votes by 7 per cent while the RPP gained 8 per cent more. 
The NAP also increased its electoral support from 3.4 per
cent to 6.4 per cent resulting 13 more additional seats in 
the parliament. Erbakan’s NSP lost half of Its seats with a 
decrease of 48 seats to 24 seats with an also decrease in 
its electoral support from 11.8 per cent to 8.6 per cent.
The transition from a predominant party system to a 
polarized party system was still continuing when Demirel 
re-established the Nationalist Front Government in August 
1977. Party fragmentation was still there with the existence 
of seven parties; JP, RPP, NSP, NAP, UP, NP and RRP. 
According to Evin, Turkey showed no significance of 
moderate multiparty system since there were four major 
parties.
The 1973 elections ushered in a new period of 
coalitions and governmental crisis. The destabilizing impact 
of fragmentation in the party system came into full force 
with the 1973 election when no party could return a 
governing majority to the National Assembly. The 1977 
elections provided no cure and governmental instability and
Ahmet Evin, The Lecture Notes on Contemporary Turkish 
Politics. POLS 306, (University of Bilkent, 1997)
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parliamentary immobility increased even more.^°° Thus, 
volatility, fragmentation and polarization of the party system 
help explain the gross instability of the Turkish political 
system during the 1970s.
At the end of 1978, a RPP government was formed 
which was supported by the independents with other two 
small parties (RRP and DP). This government won a vote of 
confidence in January 1978. When the 1979 partial 
elections showed a dramatic decrease in the votes of RPP, 
with a loss of five seats in the National Assembly, Ecevit 
resigned from the premiership. The last government of the 
seventies was Demirel’s minority government which was 
supported by Erbakan’s NSP and NAP of Türke§. While 
these political changes were taking place, the country was 
faced with an increasing political violence. The trouble in 
the 1970s was principally clashes between leftist and 
rightist student g r o u p s . T e r r o r i s m  had been tem porarily 
suppressed during the 1971-73 by the martial law adm inist­
ration, but it had re-emerged in the second half of the deca­
de on a far more frightening scale. Clashes between leftists 
and rightists, murders, kidnappings and robberies,gradually
108 Ergüder and Hofferbert, “Election”, 88-89
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grew in frequency. The universities were constantly being 
brought to a standstill by demonstrations, boycotts and 
even armed battles. Partisan differences delayed the 
declaration of martial law in various provinces where the 
police had been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the 
p r o b l e m . I t  was only after the large-scale communal clash 
in Kahramanmaraş in December 1978 that Ecevit changed 
his attitude and declared martial law in 11 provinces. But to 
the end, the martial law commanders were under restric­
tions in their freedom to take decisive measu res.^”  The 
events of Kahramanmaraş were the proof of the de­
nominational dimension of the violence between Alevis (the 
leftists) and Sunnis (the extreme rightists). And there were 
more than hundred people murdered and almost thousand 
people badly injured. Thus Kahramanmaraş events became 
a turning point in Turkish politics. There were also bloody 
clashes among the groups of the extreme left and the 
extreme right. The extreme left groups of the Turkish 
People’s Liberation Front, the Maoist-inspired Turkish 
workers and the Peasants Liberation Army had carried out 
selected assassinations of prominent victims throughout the 
country “ ...... terrorists had kidnapped and murdered the
110
111
Ibid., 193 
Ibid., 193
54
Israeli Consul-General in I s t a n b u l . T h e  assassination of 
Abdi İpekçi— the head editor of Turkish daily newspaper 
M illiyet— on February 1979, and of Nihat Erim— former 
prime minister of Turkey from 1971-72— on July 1980 were 
just a few examples of those political assassinations. In 
July 1980, reportedly 23 people were murdered in Çorum,
these events being another example of large-scale 
communal clashes based on denominational conflicts. On
the other hand, there was another source of violence based 
on ethnic cleavages namely the ongoing struggle between 
Kurdish separatists and the Turkish state. The fight was 
carried out by Kurdish militants against the Turkish state to 
establish an autonomous federation in South-Eastern 
Turkey.
In 1980, immobilism was at its peak point at the level 
of political elites despite the alarming rise of internal 
violence and the worsening of the economy. Polarization of 
political elites was once more proved with the presidential 
election crisis on April 1980. The leaders of the two major 
parties, the JP of Demirel and the RPP of Ecevit were 
unable to reach a consensus upon a common candidate to 
be elected as the new president of Turkish Republic. The 
effortless rounds in GNA would continue until 12 September 
1980 without having any success.
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One reason for this immobilism was the personal
clashes between the leaders of the two major parties. A
second reason was the concern by political parties to
increase their own share of the economic pie generated by
the economic policies in the 1970s. The coalition partners
tried simultaneously both to retain their separate identity by
maximizing the ideological distance between themselves
and their partners in the eyes of their constituents and to
stay in a coalition so as to allocate as much public
resources as possible to their clients.
Coalition governments in which the partners were 
mainly interested in diverting public allocations to 
their own constituents so that they could grow at the 
expense of their partners, hardly proved a suitable 
environment for political action. Governments became 
paralyzed and immobilized. They could not initiate 
major new policies to cope with the economic and 
political problems the country was facing.
2.2 An Analysis of the Economic Crisis
In addition to the basic maladies of the Turkish 
political system discussed in the previous section there 
were also some illnesses of Turkish economy which had to 
be cured in the late 1970s.
Turkish democracy collapsed in 1980 because of two 
main reasons; the first was the catastrophic decline in law
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and order, virtually amounting to a state of civil war. And 
the second was the economic hardship. Hershlag describes 
this as “the imperfect civil leadership that followed the first 
two m ilitary coups, in 1960 and then in 1970 proved unable 
to maintain stability and sustain continuous economic 
progress sim ultaneously.” ” ® The resulting social and 
political unrest and economic d ifficu lties caused another 
round of m ilitary intervention in I9 6 0 .” ® The factors which 
led to the m ilitary takeovers in 1970 and in 1980 were 
mainly socio-economic and domestic political unrest.”  ^ On 
the economic front, between 1960 and 1973, the GNP was 
more than doubled and the average inflation rate was 
around 8 per cent per year. Turkey’s balance of payments 
also showed a marked improvement with the steady growth 
of the industrial sector by turning out to a semi-industrialized 
econom y.” ®
The policies of ISI have been hailed as a major step 
towards economic independence. This attitude has its 
origins in the etatism developed during the 1930s. State 
regulation had been important in creating an industrial
Z.Y.Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth (Leiden: 
Brill, 1968), 21
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bourgeoisie in Turkey and had been a policy that played a 
very important role in the establishment of Turkish industry.” ® 
Since ISI relies on the adm inistrative allocation of scarce 
economic resources, especially foreign exchange, it led to 
increasing contacts between government functionaries and 
private sector representatives and these contacts created 
the basis of a convergence of interests between industry 
and bureaucracy.’ ®^ Government allocation of scarce 
resources has, in turn, generated fierce competition among 
the various private sector groups attempted to influence 
government policy. Economic development strategy through 
the very action of private sector, became an important issue 
of political discourse, since various private sector groups 
attempted to influence government policies.
Import controls emerged as the most important mecha­
nism of ISI. There were two basic policies for controlling 
imports: tariffs on various import items and quantitative 
restrictions in the form of import licensing. Tariffs mainly 
served as a source of revenue for government coffers while 
quantitative restrictions proved to be a more effic ient form 
of controlling exports.” ’^ Since imports were restricted, the
” ®Atilla Eralp “The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies” 
in Turkish State-Turkish Society, Atilla Eralp and Nükhet Sırman 
(eds.), (London: Routhledge, 1990), 223
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import regime also became a major arena of competition 
among various entrepreneurs trying to get hold of machinery 
and essential intermediate goods needed for production. 
Entrepreneurs who had import permits were able to obtain 
scarce foreign exchange at the official rate, which was 
much lower than the market price, and therefore they 
increased their profits considerably. They were able to 
import intermediate goods at prices lower than their market 
values, with the state subsidising the difference. A restricted 
import regime meant that such entrepreneurs were able to 
enjoy monopolistic privileges in a protected market.
The policies of ISI, especially the quantitative 
restrictions, became the pillars of protectionism and were 
functional in the consolidation of the internal market in 
Turkey. Since ISI was mainly a policy geared to the creation 
of new industries, it was industrialists who had to demand 
the relocation of a particular item from the liberalised to the 
quota or restricted lists. This move invariably operated to 
undermine the role of the merchants. As the daily functioning 
of ISI mechanisms was transformed into a spoils system, 
the determination of the main beneficiaries became a major 
public issue. During the course of ISI, the private sector’s 
main demand from the state was the institution and
122 Ibid., 226
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administration of an import regime that would ease the 
production of consumer goods for a domestic market.
The early years of the Republic particularly after the 
Great Depression of 1929 were known as the ‘Etatist 
Period’ . The new Republic was an overwhelmingly agricul­
tural country which had to rely on imports to satisfy its 
needs for manufactured goods. A fter the Great Depression 
of 1929, the economic crisis was approached by the pro­
mulgation of Etatism. Under Etatism, the state basicly 
aimed to serve two functions: in addition to its traditional 
regulatory duties, it would assume the task of producing 
goods for the national economy. Thus, the Etatist state 
undertook to enhance the country’s basic infrastructure, 
while also engaging itself in almost all facets of manufac­
turing. The Etatist state stretched its capabilities into 
sectors of considerable private sector activity. “Etatism had 
come to represent the foundation of Turkey’s mixed 
economy, even though its actual application went far 
beyond the conventional notions of mixed economy.
In 1935, Atatürk argued about the definition and 
interpretation of Etatism as follows;
Turkish Etatism is not a system which borrows ideas 
that have constantly been harped on by socialist 
theoreticians of the 19*  ^ century; it is a system
Ibid., 228-229 
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peculiar to Turkey, which has evolved from the 
principle of private activity of the individual, but 
places on the State responsibility for the national 
economy, with consideration of the needs of a great 
nation and large country, and of many things that 
have not been done so far. The Turkish Republican 
State wanted to do quickly things which had not been 
done throughout the centuries in the Turkish mother­
land by individual or private activity: and, as we 
realised, it succeeded in doing this in a short time. 
This road which we have followed is, as we have 
seen, a system different from liberalism.
After the final blow which came to Etatism with the
Republican’s big defeat in the 1950 elections the DP openly
adopted a policy that instituted the private sector as the
spearhead of economic development, a position that
increasingly became known in Turkey as ‘libera lism ’. In
Turkey, in the 1950s, the mechanisms of ISI helped the
relatively smooth transformation of merchants into industrialists
when the first measures of ISI, that is import controls,
began to be i m p l e m e n t e d . I n  the sixties, the debate which
set liberalism against etatism was trans-formed into an
opposition between central planning and the private sector
initiative.
When the State Planning Organisation (SPO) was 
established in 1969, it signalled that the state was to play 
the crucial role in managing the process of Turkish 
industrialisation. The SPO became the central body of ISI,
Hershlag, “Growth” , 71 
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as coordinator of the allocation of resources. For bureaucrats in 
the Economic Development Section of the SPO as well as 
for the RPP, industrialisation presupposed the guardian role 
of the state as planner.For private industria lists,th is attitude 
smacked of the etatism of the 1930s,and they were prepared 
to do everything in their power to avoid a repetition of that 
period.
During the 1960s there were formed close links bet­
ween Justice Party and the Turkish Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) which was established in 
1950 by law as an umbrella organisation. This organisation 
had a semi-legal status and after 1960 possessed the right 
to allocate foreign exchange and quota list. Moreover, it 
was also this institution that determined the selling price of 
items imported into T u r k e y . T h e  government was sensi­
tive to the demands of the TOBB, whose chairmen were 
usually appointed after close consultations. “ In the course 
of the implementation of ISI and as allocation struggles 
become important, these smooth ties to the ruling party 
became unravelled, as was the internal unity of the TOBB.”^^ ^
The economic problems of the 1970s were defined as 
first, the domestic orientation of industrial development
’2^  Ibid.. 227 
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which left Turkey with an excess of high-cost import 
replacement industries and second, the mismanagement of 
the public sector which caused an inflationary deficit finan­
cing.^^® Hershlag argues that in Turkey, the economic 
strategies of the 1970s were basicly the continuation of 
1930s’ inward oriented p o l i c i e s . H a l e  seems to agree with 
Hershlag’s opinions as since he states that: “most of 
Turkey’s economic problems derived essentially from 
decisions taken as early as the 1 9 3 0 s . F o r  instance, 
during the post-war period the Democrat Party radically 
reoriented economic policies, putting greater emphasis on 
agricultural development, but their plans to create a 
liberalized economy remained stubborn. Instead, the 
Democrats used the public sector industries to buy votes 
and to maintain the appearance of economic growth.
These policies had negative effects on the industrial 
efficiency and, thus, caused damage to the national 
economy. Going back to Hershlag, the same policies helped 
Turkey, in the short run, in the 1930s and part of the 1940s, 
by improving external balances, enhancing the feeling of
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economic and political independence and laying the 
foundations for the diversification of the economy; but in 
the longer run they gave rise to growing inefficiencies. 
Capital intensive plants with under-utilized capacity 
together with shortages in physical and high-grade human 
capital could only result in inefficiency. The cost-plus 
methods which were used in the allocation of resources 
also led to distortions. The deeper social inequalities and 
the disadvantages of these policies started to emerge in the 
longer run.^^^ One of the main disadvantages was that the 
price of inward-oriented development strategy was excessive, 
and led in combination with other factors to frequent 
distruptions of the whole economic, social and political 
s y s t e m . E c o n o m i c  interventionism often accompanied this 
system or strategy, even in the ‘libera l’ Menderes period 
and interm ittent military intervention.^^®
On the other hand. Hale complains that the post-1960 
governments,from the economic point of view, with their legal 
authority over the state enterprises gave no real independence 
to public sector m a n a g e r s . I n s t e a d  investment and
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employment was used as an instrument to benefit the
138ambitious politicians.
According to Togan, by the end of 1960s, Turkey was 
faced with a situation where it had two different economic 
strategies to choose from: first, “ it could either embark on 
exportation of manufactured goods or second, it could move 
on to the second stage of import substitution. Turkey chose 
the second strategy and replaced the imports of intermediate 
goods by domestic p r o d u c t i o n . H a v i n g  chosen the second 
stage of import substitution caused the maintenance of the 
pace of growth to become more costly since the commodities 
of the second stage required more skilled and technical 
labour and were more capital intensive.
Although the industrialization of the economy continued 
after 1973, a relatively good year for the Turkish economy, 
fQiiowing years saw a fourfold increase in oil prices and 
the stagflation and unemployment in the country. Hershlag 
states that the sharp change for the worse immediately 
after 1973 must be attributed to an increase in the imports 
of oil since the cost of oil products rose by 350 per cent, 
the current account changed from a surplus of US $660
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million to a deficit of US $561 millionJ'*^ For instance, while 
in 1973 the oil bill constituted only 10 per cent of Turkish 
imports, it had risen to 25 per cent by 1977 and 48.7 per 
cent in 1980. In absolute terms, it increased from US $1.7 
billion in 1973 to US $3.8 billion in 1 9 8 0 . These higher 
oil prices of course worked their way through into the 
overall price level; the whole sale price index rose by 28.9 
per cent in 1974, by around 16 per cent during 1975 and 
1976 and then by around 25 per cent in the following
year. 143
According to Oni§ and Riedel, the main sources of the 
economic crisis, especially the one from 1977 to 1980 were 
caused by external shocks. For instance, the OPEC set oil 
prices were effective in the case of the 1977-1980 crisis.
According to Hale, during the economic crisis of this 
period the government policies failed to deal with the 
problems and in fact they probably worsened the situation. 
Foreign exchange shortages had caused bottlenecks in the 
supply of producer goods, spare parts and consumer goods 
which led to a fall in industrial and total product and
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stirnulated inflation. The inflation rate climbed up from 44 
per cent in 1978 to 107 per cent in 1980.^^® Turkey was 
unable to meet the demands of fuel, raw materials and 
spare parts. When power cuts became a daily fact of life, 
factories could not work efficiently and the most necessary 
commodities of daily life such as petrol, medicines, light 
bulbs, sugar, cooking oil periodically disappeared from the 
shops, forcing people who could afford it to go to black 
market.
On the other hand, Turkey was faced with a massive 
foreign borrowing in 1977 mainly in the form of commercial 
and other short-term credits at very high interest rates to 
cover its deficits, which in turn caused a sharp increase in 
the debt service b u r d e n . i t  also became clear that the 
official balance of payments figures of the late 1970s could 
only give a partial picture of Turkish foreign trade since 
there was also an enormous black market in both imported 
and exported goods. To cite an example, in 1976 the total 
amount of illegal imports was estimated at US $2 billion per 
year and while by 1979 smuggled imports had reportedly 
reached US $4 billion per year. '^*® The illegal imports list 
included items such as gold, guns and consumer goods as
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well as industrial equipment and raw materials. The overall 
value of these imports was almost equal to the value of 
offic ia lly recorded trade, which meant Turkey’s industry 
would almost have reached the point of total collapse.
According to Hale, the overvaluation of the Lira was 
an important contributor to the country’s poor export 
performance between 1974 and 1979.’®° The Turkish 
currency was overvalued by about 50 percent by 1977. 
Further devaluation of the Lira in 1979 and in early 1980, 
did no more than restore it to something like its real 
pa rity .’®’ Hershlag argues that the political changes, the 
particularistic concepts and interests of the vying parties 
and the weak coalitions of the 1970s also contributed to the 
inflationary d i s t o r t i o n s . H e r s h l a g ,  sums it all up as 
“exogenous and endogenous” factors such as deficits in the 
balance of payments, the shortage in foreign debt, falling 
growth rates, rising unemployment, large deficits in the 
domestic public sector plus increasing social and regional 
inequality and rapidly expanding double, and then even 
trip le-d ig it in fla tion.’®®
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Because of the instability during the 1970s, according 
to Oni§ and Riedel, there were only two ways to satisfy the 
competing claims of interest groups. As they have stated; 
one was to borrow resources from abroad and spread them 
around: the other was to resort to inflation. Turkey tried 
both of them .” ®^'* This justifies the argument of Hale which is 
“ investment ... was used as an instrument to get benefited 
by the ambitious p o l i t i c i a n s . T h i s ,  then contributed to 
increase in the acceleration of inflation thus a dramatic 
increase in income inequality occurred causing a social 
unrest and civil disorder. The largest inequality was 
between the rural and the urban incomes. Even the agricul­
tural terms of trade which were improving up until 1977 
began to decline after this period with the acceleration of 
inflation.^®® The real level of agricultural price support was 
eroded and the relative prices of domestic substitutes of 
imported inputs were r a i s e d . A c c o r d i n g  to Hershlag:
... inequality of income distribution was even more 
serious than in the past, with the lowest 3.8 per cent 
of households receiving 0.5 per cent of disposable 
income and the highest 3.2 per cent of households 
receiving 21.8 per cent of income. Another 
comparison shows that the lowest 10 per cent of 
households had to be satisfied with 1.96 per cent of
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income as against the top 10 per cent of households 
collecting over 30 per cent of income, a ratio of more
158than 15:1.
The inequalities were also seen in other areas such 
as educational and public services facilities.
The popular perception of the striking gap between 
rich and poor, between the shanty-towns of Istanbul, or 
Ankara and the fashionable middle-class suburbs, was a 
major cause of the political violence in the late 1970s.^^®
By August 1980, Turkey’s economic situation was worst 
than ever and as Hale points out: “taken by itself, this 
economic chaos might have been enough to bring about a 
political c o l l a p s e . T h e r e  was no clear sign that the 
stabilization and adjustment program introduced in January 
1980 would suffice to rescue the problems of the economy 
and the incapacity of the civilian regime to deal with 
Turkey’s frightening economic problems. Also Hershlag 
states that, “the efforts which were made to control the 
situation prior to the military coup appeared to be too little
and too late. ..161
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Table -  2 Indicators of Inflation, 1970-1980^®^
Year (w holesa le
1970 11.9
1971 15.9
1972 18.0
1973 20.5
1974 28.9
1975 16.2
1976 16.1
1977 24.9
1978 43.8
1979 67.8
1980 107.2
* Sources: DIE (SIS), (Yearbook of Statistics), 1984 and 1985; DIE, 
Wholesale and Consumer Price indices, April 1985.
As can be seen from Table -  2, inflation started a 
spiralling increase in 1977 and reached a peak in 1980. The 
stabilization programmes of 1978 and 1979 did not produce 
any substantial results and political and social unrest 
caused a huge loss of work days in 1979. None of the 
thirteen government coalitions of the 1970s were able to 
meet economic and social challenges. On the contrary, they
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magnified the p r o b l e m s . H e r s h l a g  explains the reason for
the m ilitary intervention as follows:
To prevent political disintegration and economic 
disaster, the m ilitary took over on 12 September 
1980. The takeover was to have been consolidated by 
the new authoritarian constitution of the end of 1982, 
which grants extensive prerogatives to the President, 
but repeatedly restates the principles of Atatürk -  
laicism, democracy and accountability of the 
authorities.
According to Şenses, the problems which were 
apparent in the second half of the 1970s can be put under 
three main headings. First, extensive protection over a long 
period of time was instrumental in the creation of a highly 
inefficient industrial structure.^®® The exports which were 
dominated by a handful of agricultural commodities, in 1978 
accounted for only 4.5 per cent GNP, which was far below 
cross-country n o r m s . S e c o n d ,  the distortion of relative 
factor prices was effective due to the maintenance of over­
valued exchange rates long periods of time plus severely 
negative real rates of interest under deep financial repression. 
Real wages, on the other hand, showed a strong upward 
trend as a reflection of populist policies. These were the
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reasons according to §enses, for low growth in employment 
in manufacturing sector together with the shift of the pattern of 
import substitution toward intermediate and capital goods.
An unrealistic, overvalued exchange rate was also one of 
the main mala-dies of Turkish economy in the late 1970s, 
and it encouraged the diversion of hard currency into the 
black m a r k e t . I n  March 1979, for instance, the black 
market exchange rate was about double of the official 
parity. So the holder of the convertible currencies such as 
emigrant workers were transferring their funds to Turkey 
through illegal channels. According to Hale, while the 
offic ia lly transferred remittances were about US $70 million 
per month during January-March 1979, they then increased 
to an average of US $200 million per month over the 
following six month period when the government increased 
the rate officia lly payable for em igrants’ remittances.^^®
The third factor relating to Turkey’s economic problems 
in the second half of the 1970s, was the emergence of 
macro-economic instability of massive p r o p o r t i o n s . T h i s  
was due to the fact that the pace of industrialization was 
pushed too far beyond the available resources plus populist
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policies were kept up in the face of severe external shocks. 
The reasons for the emergence of severe balance of 
payments difficulties were mainly due to new investments in 
the manufacturing sector on imports. Moreover, growing 
public sector deficits and import shortages were largely 
responsible for the rise of inflation in the late 1 9 7 0 s . T h e  
rate of growth of manufacturing investment declined as a 
result of sharp deterioration in investment and growth 
performance in the manufacturing sector. Thus, capacity 
utilization rates declined sharply. The rate of growth of 
manufacturing output declined from 14.2 per cent per 
annum during 1973 and 1977 to an average of minus 0.6 
per cent per annum during 1978 and 1980.
The Demirel government of 1979-80 initiated what 
was claimed to be was “a major change in the orientation of 
economic policy” including a further devaluation, de-restriction 
of most prices in the public and private sectors, plans to 
reduce the public sector deficit and the deregulation of 
domestic interest r a t e s . T h e  crisis was deepened by the 
oil shock. In 1973-74, Turkish economy was faced with 
1973 oil crisis, 1974 Cyprus War and 1975 US arms embargo 
which led the burden of exchange rate problems.
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Turkey did not make the painful adjustments necessary 
to overcome the impact of the oil price increases unlike the 
rest of the v\/orld; instead it used its reserves to cushion the 
blow and thus avoided raising the prices of domestic fuel 
due to political preferences.^^® Nevertheless, the increase in 
oil prices was not the only factor in the crisis. In the general 
inflationary atmosphere, all countries were increasing the 
prices of their own exports as a response to higher oil 
prices, but not Turkey. For Turkey, “the sharp contraction in 
the volume of imports -  by more than 40 percent for the 
non-oil category -  affected all sectors of the economy, the 
worst and most dependent of all being m anufacturing.” ^^®
On the top of the oil crisis, the Cyprus crisis broke out 
in 1974 which had devastating results on the Turkish economy. 
In addition to the cost of the operation the continued 
maintenance of large numbers of troops on the island plus 
the subsidization of the Turkish Cypriot administration 
played an effective role on the crisis. When the American 
Congress placed an embargo on Turkey, this took an 
additional toll. The US arms embargo forced Turkey to use 
valuable foreign exchange resources to buy a r m s . T h u s ,  
these three external events, the oil crisis, the Cyprus
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Intervention and the resulting American embargo were 
worsened an already not-so-bright economy.
By means of the relations between state and business 
during all of the 1970s private sector cleavages were 
reflected in the proliferation of political parties. Political 
parties and private sector organizations becarne progressively 
embroiled in each other’s a f f a i r s . W h i l e  the state could 
have used the private sector’s divisions to strengthen its 
limited autonomy, it chose to appease the different groups 
of the private sector by using the resources, specifically 
economic rents. This had an opposite effect such that the 
divisions and conflicts within the private sector made a 
decisive contribution to the political -  economic deadlock 
by corrupting and paralyzing the state. One of the causes of 
confusion and uncertainty in the political arena was the 
turmoil within the private sector. Most of the conflicts were 
raised by state intervention in the economy for rent 
maximization. The loser in the process was the state which 
was restricted in its ability to produce coherent policies. 
Since the party leaders were not able to speak with one 
voice the various governments could not provide the 
needed leadership. On the other hand, the lack of consensus 
among the private sector destroyed any chance of
178 Ibid., 149
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coordinated action or policy p r o p o s a l . T U S I A D  was also 
unable to get rid of the disharmony among its members. In 
a meeting on the February 1979, “while some TUSIAD 
members complained about the problems of industry, the
inability to generate profits, the decline in production ......
other members said they were perfectly satisfied and that 
they had never had such a prosperous and happy year.” ®^° A 
complex political dynamic was produced because of the 
proliferation of political parties and private sector cleavages. 
In such an atmosphere of increased politicization, every 
struggle and every issue had a political effect. The state 
was overwhelmed with demands but neither utilized nor 
managed by interests of private s e c t o r s . A c c o r d i n g  to 
Barkey, what kept the system going was the state’s ability 
to mediate the different demands through the system of rent 
d istribution.’ “  Thus, "it was not surprising that the state 
regained some of its autonomy when sources of economic 
rents dried up as a result of the intensification of the 
economic cris is .” ’ “  Barkey argues that the collapse of the 
economy convinced both state and society of the need to
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implement radical change and set the stage for the 1980 
m ilitary intervention. The beginning of the crisis is 
explained by Barkey as follows; “ if there was one single 
event which pinpoints the beginning of the crisis, it would 
be the February 1977 indefinite suspension of transfers of 
currency abroad.
In light of the economic situation of the country, it 
would be acceptable to say that people were feeling 
increasingly insecure and restiess, specifically the middle- 
class people, as a result of economic crisis with its definite 
consequences and of the ravages of street fights and violence. 
Class conflicts caused mainly by the huge income inequalities 
both between the rural and the urban areas and between 
the different segments of the urban areas reached to their 
peak. Power became no more than an instrument for the 
promotion of interests of ambitious politicians. So,people 
had no choice rather than to look for a ‘substantial identity ’ 
or a ‘social body’ which is welded to its head to virtually 
restructure the whole society so that no social divisions 
exist such as labour unions and at the same time all signs 
of differences of opinion are forbidden. Also a society 
where power is embodied in a group and at its highest 
level, in a single individual in such a way that nothing can 
split it apart.
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Claude Lefort, in his writing “On Modern Democracy”
argues that sometimes democracy itse lf makes room for
totalitarian institutions, modes of organization or modes of
representation. He also states that if a totalitarian form of
society is to arise then a change in the economy of power is
required.^®® Thus, he makes the following judgement :
When individuals are increasingly insecure as a result 
of an economic crisis or of the ravages of war, when 
conflict between classes and groups is exacerbated 
and can no longer be symbolically resolved within the 
political sphere, when power appears to have sunk to 
the level of reality and to be no more than an 
instrument for the promotion of the interests and 
appetites of vulgar ambition and when, in a word, it 
appears in society and when at the same time society 
appears to be fragmented, then we see the 
development of the fantasy of the People-as-One, for 
a social body which is welded to its head, for an 
embodying power for a state free from division.^®®
What he argues is that the term “despotism ” can be
used to characterize the regime described in his above
judgment.Despotism may grow in democracies and authoritarian,
even if not totalitarian, institutions may also find a space
and might well be accepted by the society when as he
states: “ individuals are increasingly insecure as a result of
an economic crisis ...” ®^^
Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory. (Published 
by the University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988), 20
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With this, I am not trying to excuse the m ilitary 
interventions so long as they are based upon a rational and 
justified reasonings, but on the contrary I am trying to 
emphasize the importance of the economic crisis and its 
consequences.
2.3 Exhaustion of ISI in Turkey
Turkey in its industrialization drive used the policies 
of import substitution industrialization. When these policies 
were accompanied by populist regimes, the ISI became 
entrenched and survived until serious economic and 
political crisis undermined the regime’s existence and led to 
m ilitary interventions. When Turkey was unable to improve 
imbalances in its economy, it came across with severe 
economic and political crisis. The reason was that, although 
it seemed as simple as the strategy itself, Turkey was not 
successful in the implementation of the second stage of ISI 
which was involved the development of machinery industry. 
In other words, the economy’s vertical integration and the 
development of the industrial entrepreneurial class did not 
reach the level of success as it did in the earlier stages of 
ISI. For instance, protectionism— one of the essential 
components of IS I- was not used properly. Although one of 
the most important characteristics of protectionism was to 
keep the state ’s involvement in the economy at a distance
80
as Gourevitch points out, it did not alter the fundamental 
relations in society.^®® Thus lack of advances in technology 
and know-how and lack of higher rate of employment and 
improved domestic standards of living did not occur as a 
result.
In 1980, Turkey experienced serious economic 
shortcomings of ISI, such as continued balance of payments 
deficits, severe foreign exchange shortages,low growth 
rates, unemployment, inefficient industrial structure, over 
capitalization and low growth rates which were supposed to 
be remedied by ISI.^ ®® Turkey was not the only country 
which faced the above crisis: Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 
1966 and 1976, Chile and Uruguay in 1973 and even India 
in 1975 had similar experiences. Barkey argues that the 
economic problems listed above were not the only causes 
but also the increased political expectations which engen­
dered by ISI contributed to the failure of the implementation 
of ISI.^®°
Similarly, in 1970, Turkey’s economy was also 
damaged by excessive reliance on substitution. A stab ili­
zation program was introduced and implemented despite
Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative 
Responses to International Economic Crisis. (lthaca:Cornell 
University Press, 1987), 47
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the private sector’s opposition. The program was successful 
in increasing foreign exchange reserves and also in 
increasing level of competitiveness within private sector. 
Although the program was successfully implemented, it 
could not be sustained because of the alienation of the 
various elements of the private sector by the stabilization 
program. Therefore, increasing pressure on the civilian 
governments and authority crisis of these governments 
resulted in the unwillingness to take further unpopular 
measures. It seems that “the domestic political repercussions 
in 1970 proved to be a prohibitive price to pay for an 
elected regime.
The reasons for the exhaustion of ISI may be 
enumerated as follows: first, excessive protection, second, 
exchange rate controls and third, imitative nature of import 
substitution. Another factor not inherent to ISI was the 
relatively small size of m a r k e t s . T h e  first critique which 
was associated with excessive protection was about the 
levels and the duration of protectionist policies. These 
policies in Turkey, stayed in place for a long period of time 
at very high levels. Short-term and mid-term protectionist 
policies are needed for the newly established industries in
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order to defend them, but in the long-term such policies 
lead to inefficiency in those newly developed industries. 
“Protectionism tends to lead to an economy-wide misallocation 
of resources instead of concentrating on industries and 
factors of production.
In addition, exchange rate controls as a protectionist 
tool causes misallocation of resources and tariffs which is 
another factor that increases prices for the consumer. 
Market distortions continue to occur if there is an absence 
of foreign competition regardless of the relatively large 
number of domestic firms. One of the main purposes of the 
ISI is to contribute a country’s export earnings by developing 
infant industries which are capable of competing in the 
outside world. But this purpose becomes defeated by the 
protective barriers that eliminate incentives for efficiency.
The cost of an imported input for domestic manufacturers is 
reduced in Turkey by maintaining artific ia lly high-exchange 
rates. While reducing the cost of imports, overvalued 
exchange rates increased the price for Turkey’s exports. In 
the seventies, the main victim of this policy became the 
agricultural sector. Turkey, especially in the 1970s, was 
considered to be an important agricultural country. But the
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decline in agricultura l exports with no proportionate 
increase in the exports of other products diminished its 
ability to earn foreign exchange. Since the indigenous 
industrialists were encouraged to invest in capital-intensive 
manufacturing techniques because of the artific ia lly  
maintained overvalued exchange rates, overcapitalization 
of industry occurred as a result. Overcapitalization then 
resulted in the segmentation of the industrial working class, 
where those worked in capital-intensive sectors gained 
considerably more than those who worked in other areas of
195manufacturing.
In the longer term high exchange rates defeated also 
the transition to the second stage of the industrialization 
drive which was supposed to be another purpose of ISI. For 
instance, specialization in various products in which the 
country had comparative advantage. After the initial stages 
of ISI, the companies were supposed to make progress 
towards the second stage vertical deepening of industry, by 
making investments in the production of sub-components or 
intermediate goods necessary for the final product. But 
instead, they rejected the second stage and jumped to a 
new and unrelated finished product line, switching, for 
instance from televisions to refrigerators. The resulted
195 Ibid., 12
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distortion in the industrial structure was to become more 
dependent on imports than before and lacks of adaptability 
to changing conditions.^®® Having become dependent on 
imports increased total imports from US $948 million in 
1970 to US $5069 million in 1979 and to US $7909 in 1980. 
When these policies in turn caused a deterioration in the 
accounts of state economic enterprises the public sector 
borrowing requirements also increased. Thus, money supply 
and inflation exploded. The government kept essentially to 
a fixed exchange-rate system in order to keep the inflation 
rate from increasing any further. Although Turkey introdu­
ced a series of minor exchange-rate adjustments, the 
spread between Turkish and worldwide inflation rate 
i n c r e a s e d . T h e  government tried to avoid the adverse 
effects of the exchange-rate appreciation by increases in 
export rebate rates and increased its control on foreign 
capital movements. This resulted once more to the growth 
of imports and the stagnation of exports. Heavy borrowing 
led to high external debt and the share of short-term debt 
increased rapidly. Consequently, the widening current 
account deficit developed into a payments crisis and Turkey 
lost its international credit-worthiness. The strategy
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198followed was no longer sustainable by the end of 1970s 
The incumbent government faced with balance of payment 
difficulties and failed to lower inflation. Under these 
conditions when the system disintegrates, most often 
bureaucratic authoritarian modes of political decision­
making become dominant since one of the motives was to 
eliminate economic h a r d s h i p . O n e  of the intermediate 
goals of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America, according to O’Donnell was to remedy the im­
balance situation of the economy which he explained as 
the lack of vertical deepening.
Oni§ and Riedel argue that ;
In economic systems in which rent-seeking behavior 
is a way of life, intensive growth based on 
improvements in efficiency or productivity is generally 
not feasible. Instead, the government pursues its 
growth objectives primarily by raising the level of 
investment across the board, with little concern for 
the relative efficiency of investment among competing 
sectors. Thus, in the presence of widespread rent- 
seeking, excess aggregate demand arising from a 
given growth target is all the more likely.
In Turkey, patterns of rent-seeking behavior are evident,
going beyond the limits of the resources, and thus playing
an active role in the failure of the implementation of the
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import-substitution policies. Public, sector investment 
programs required more resources than could be extracted 
from private sector through taxation. The resulting excess 
aggregate demand was the source of economic crisis and 
was also cause of the high and rising level of inflation in 
Turkey.
Another major cause for the exhaustion of ISI was due 
to imitative nature of im port-substitution. Borrowing from 
Hirschman, Barkey argues that ISI is a replication of con­
ventional capitalist methods of industrialization and is a 
“tightly staged p r o c e s s . I S I  is “a matter of imitation and 
importation of tried and tested methods and is therefore far- 
less learning i n t e n s i v e . E s p e c i a l l y  the elites of the less 
developed countries try to follow the consumption patterns 
exhibited by the industrialized societies. Therefore, the ISI 
efforts tend to gravitate towards the production of consumer 
durables. According to Barkey, “as less developed countries 
imitate the more developed societies’ consumption patterns, 
the incentives to domestically manufacture such products 
increase, especially since their imports are either banned or 
severely restricted by the import regime. These industries
Ibid., 92-93 
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tend to be capital intensive and discourage s a v i n g s . F o r  
instance, Turkish automobile production got underway in 
1970 at a time when the GNP per capita was US $273 
where this figure was around US $1000 in Western European 
countries when American automobile corporations entered 
there. As a result, the automobile industry became highly 
inefficient due to insufficient export possibilities and lack of 
domestic demand to keep the industry in existence.^®®
One of the other factors which contributed to IS I’s 
exhaustion in Turkey was the presence of the relatively 
small size of domestic market. This is very much apparent
in consumer durables, when according to Barkey “ ......... the
relative market growth becomes mainly vertical, that is, it is 
based on the purchasing power of the high income sectors. 
This is due to two main factors: first, the high capital density 
per unit of output precludes the large scale absorption of 
labor; second, the high unit value of the goods produced 
permits the entry into the consumer markets of small sectors 
of the population.
Barkey holds the state authority responsible for the 
failure of ISI in Turkey, in Latin America and elsewhere. It 
is the absence of the state authority which is free of
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dominant class interferonc© and is powsrful ©nough to 
impos© its own solutions on th© ©conomic probl©ms. In 
Turk©y, th© stat© did not act with d©t©rmination and vision 
wh©n it cam© to promoting ©xports or limiting prot©ction, 
and th© stat© authoriti©s w©r© incapabi© of addr©ssing ISI’s 
imp©rf©ctions and inh©r©nt bias©s. Th© Bur©aucratic 
Authoritarian stat©s which ©m©rg©d from th© crisis of ISI 
in Latin Am©rica brought “a d©gr©© of fr©©dom of action.
In 1980, th© collaps© of social ord©r caus©d by th© 
paralyz©d and divid©d stat© institutions and by th© lack of 
th© d©gr©© of fr©©dom of action in stat© authoriti©s had 
r©sult©d in th© long-t©rm crisis of ISI which th©n l©d to 
pra©torian politics und©rmin©d th© r©gim© in Turk©y. Th© 
gov©rnm©nts w©r© unabi© to tak© tim©ly and d©cisiv© action 
to r©m©dy th© ISI-induc©d dislocations in Turk©y. Th© stat© 
must tak© a long©r vi©w inst©ad of short-t©rm goals in its 
d©cision making proc©ss for th© comp©tition of r©nts. H©r©, 
th© stat© n©©ds to b© an autonomous stat© in ord©r to b© 
abl© to tak© th© n©c©ssary actions. It is this autonomy 
which ©nabl©s th© stat© to av©rt probl©ms and to convinc© 
th© dominant classas and soci©ty that it is acting in their 
long-term i n t e r e s t s . A s  th© crisis deepened in Turkey, th©
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state found itself weaker and weaker and at the final stage 
the state authority was completely challenged.
2.4. The Political and Economic Consequences of the 
Crisis of Import Substitution
As has been discussed earlier, one of the most 
important political consequences of the crisis of import 
substitution is probably the contribution that it made to the 
emergence of a Bureaucratic Authoritarian regime. In 
Turkey, the gradually increasing crisis in economic and 
political fields demonstrate the extent to which the 
emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regime had been 
realized. Consequently, in the meantime, there was also 
growing consciousness on the need for some basic and new 
reforms in economy.
After ISI was exhausted the Turkish economy was 
faced with a crisis situation; rising inflation, shortage in 
foreign currencies and balance of payment d ifficu lties which 
undermined the viability of populist coalition governments. 
Attributing the crisis to the threat of political activation 
within the popular sectors continued to press for improvements 
in their living standards which encouraged m ilitary coup in 
Turkey. The necessary move after the coup was a trend 
towards internationalization and an export oriented market. 
January 24, 1980, stabilization measures was the move in
90
order to set up a new economic order including export- 
oriented policies. This move was made by the military 
government of 12 September 1980. Therefore, the military 
came with rather different economic policies and intended 
to stay for a longer period of time. According to Turker 
Alkan, one of the other insistent rumors on 1980 military 
coup in Turkey is for the enabling of 24 January 1980 
economic measures radically.^’ “
Although the bureaucratic authoritarian regime came 
because of a series of outcomes after the exhaustion of 
import substitution the military intended to follow different 
economic policies, export-oriented policies, for establishing 
a new order rather than to follow the deepening proposition 
of O’Donnell. Turkey, rather than putting emphasis in the 
vertical integration of the industrial sector through an increase 
in state and/or international capital investments in “heavy 
industries” , followed traditional orthodox economic remedies 
which mainly supported the export sector.
Barkey argues that the exhaustion of ISI made a 
significant contribution to the emergence of bureaucratic 
authoritarian regimes in Latin A m e r i c a . S i m i l a r  to
TOrker Alkan, The Lecture Notes on Seminar on Turkish 
Politics. POLS 590. (University of Bilkent, 1998)
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O’Donnell who has argued that ISI-induced crisis have only 
been resolved through dramatic brakes with the past and 
the bureaucratic authoritarian states are representative of 
this dramatic brake.
In O’Donnell’s model one of the main reasons for the 
m ilitary’s intervention is to achieve the vertical deepening 
of the industrial structure by instituting new economic 
p o l i c i e s . Q u o t i n g  from Hirschman, Barkey indicates that 
Hirschman himself also addresses himself to the same 
issue as he states:
The economic problems of which the policy and coup 
makers were most conscious were, first, inflation and 
second balance of payments disequilibrium especially 
when foreign exchange reserves were threatening to 
run out. Those who were responsible for turning Latin 
American politics in the authoritarian direction, partly 
under the impact of those twin crisis, had some notion 
about the political and economic problems that were 
in turn responsible for the immediate emergency.
Economic instabilities and the failure in the industria­
lization drive is mostly associated with the politicization of 
the popular classes in the decision making processes in 
both economic and political matters. O’Donnell argues that 
in addition to deepening, the bureaucratic authoritarian 
state also aims at the economic exclusion of popular 
classes and gets itself staffed by technocrats and bureaucrats
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who can de-politicize those segments of society which 
played significant role in the decision making processes. 
Quoting from Hirschman, Barkey also argues that while ISI 
declined in its effectiveness, policy makers and industrialists 
also failed in search of new possibilities and patterns such 
as the expansion of manufacturing exports, broadening of 
the tax base and the financing of development through the 
use of industrial sector p r o f i t s . T h e  reason why these 
opportunities were missed out was not because of the 
absence of the deepening but due to the lack of a transition 
to more orthodox economic policies. According to Barkey, a 
transition to greater economic orthodoxy requires leadership 
on the part of state authorities as well as on the part of 
industrialists. If industrialists are willing to push for change, 
the state officials will then be equally complacent about 
their already existing policies. Although Turkey took a step 
towards the transition to more orthodox economic policies 
with 24 January 1980 economic stabilization measures, it 
was too late to regain the political stability which lacked a 
leadership of the part of state authorities. For example, 
Demirel and Ecevit were not able to speak with one voice 
due to differentiation in their political preferences and the
O'Donnell, “Bureaucratic", 31-32 
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various governments led by either one of them could not 
provide the needed leadership on the part of state 
authorities.
Another outcome of the exhaustion of ISI is the
legitimacy crisis caused by the stagnant economy and the
organized mass mobilization of the urban lower classes and
the intelligentsia (students, frustrated professionals and
intellectuals). Thus, declining economy and mass radicalism
prepared the stage for a revolutionary situation, a m ilitary
rule. Since, the private sector in Turkey depended on the
policies of the state from which economic rents were
generated the tendency of the private sector to influence
policy choices was a clear case. Moreover, private sector
was also divided in itself over such policies as protectionism,
foreign trade and exchange rate policy, direct foreign
investments, land and tax reform and bank credits. With the
exhaustion of the state economic policies and industrialization
efforts the fight for maximizing economic rents increased
even further and thus cleavages and conflict within the
body of private sector reached its peak.
Any notion of consensus between the various groups 
of the private sector had completely no affin ity to the 
notion of cooperation. If opposition to devaluation and 
consensus on the issue of foreign exchange 
availabilities was the sign of a temporary demise of 
suspicion and hospitality, obsession with rent
218 Ibid., 166
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maximization never managed to escape from the 
acrimony of the private sector.^’®
Since rent maximization was dependent on state
policies, the private cleavages and the fragmentation of the
Turkish party system with the consequence of a proliferation
of political parties representing different interests, played a
crucial role both in the manipulation of state’s autonomy
and in the exhaustion of import substitution. Increasing
societal demands put the state under the pressure of
implementing this excession and rendered the state unable
to implement the necessary orthodox policies in order to
prevent from such a crisis.
After the exhaustion of ISI the state’s autonomy
weakened and a complete chaos situation was dominant in
the country’s economy. In open and competing political
systems, political parties and other forms of representation
of the differentiated societal interests constitute a dangerous
force, if the state is unable to maintain the economic
stability as well as its autonomy. Therefore, the economic
and political crisis are closely attached to the weak
autonomy of the state. And the weakness in the state’s
autonomy may then cause a damage to the country’s
economy. Although the 24 January 1980 stabilization
219
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measures had demonstrated that there was a remedy to the 
country’s problems, the exhaustion of ISI with the collapse 
in economy opened the path for the military to come 
forward as the ‘guardian’ of the national interest and the 
state autonomy.
12 September 1980 m ilitary intervention should be 
seen as a result of social and political crisis, as well as the 
weakening of state autonomy caused by the governments’ 
inability to impose orthodox and rational policies in the 
economy for preventing polarization, fragmentation and 
degeneration of the system.
According to Barkey, “the state’s contribution to IS I’s 
decline is a consequence of its inaction, which exacerbates 
the adverse conditions and indirectly prepares the ground 
for the armed forces to intervene
Waisman argues that the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy is mediated by the strength of 
the markets; that is to say an institutionalized market 
economy is conducive to a stable liberal d e m o c r a c y . T h e  
institutionalization of the market economy is dependent on 
the successfulness of the governments in applying the ISI
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policies. Although the institutionalization process generates 
rent-seeking capitalist class, middle and working classes 
their survival should not necessarily depend on the 
maintenance of market restrictions on one hand, and on the 
other hand the governments should not go far beyond the 
limits of its resources in rent distribution. An autonomous 
state which is well aware of its limits and determined to 
take the necessary actions in order to implement import 
substitution policies will not let itse lf trapped among the 
different private sector groups vying for these economic 
rents, a fact that undermines, its autonomy. Quoting from 
Hirschman, as Collier states, ISI’s exhaustion and 
shortcomings are not due to its inherent tendency of the 
policy in itself, but rather policies and policy makers were 
to be blamed for bringing the exhaustion of the ISI.^^^
According to E. Fuat Keyman, another consequence 
of the crisis has emerged at the ideological level. It also led 
to the crisis of the ideologies of populism which he calls 
‘developmentalism’ and ‘nat ional ism’ . T h e s e  ideologies 
serve for the reproduction of society on the basis of 
national-integral development and they require the association
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of different sectors or groups around the nationalistic pact. 
But the increase in the political mobilization of the popular 
sector and the breakdown of the relationships between the 
populist state and popular sector as a result of the crisis 
situation, created the internal shift from nationalism to 
'national security’ . Since ‘developmentalism ’ was initia lly 
based on the ISI and on its advantages of the dominant 
sector, the breakdown of relationships between these two 
also created another internal shift from integral development 
to ‘national security’ ,Therefore, the control over the activities 
of the popular by the state and the legitim ization of the 
state in the process of exclusion of the popular sector from 
the state apparatus had to be maintained through ‘national 
securi ty’ . A s  a result, in addition to the consequences of 
the crisis both at the level of economic and political, it can 
be argued that the consequences of the crisis at the ideological 
level also paved the way to the formation of bureaucratic 
authoritarian state. Therefore, the rise of ‘national security’ 
as the main object of bureaucratic authoritarian state 
played a key role in transition to the new phase of delayed 
dependent development.
225 Ibid., 157-158
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CHAPTER III
THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION
3.1. The 1980 Military Intervention
I have already dealt with the notion of bureaucratic- 
authoritarianism as a concept referring generally to a specific 
type of political regime which emerges after a ‘crisis situation’. 
Since the most visible aspects of this ‘crisis situation ’ are 
basicly manifested in economics of the country,inevitably 
the military becomes involved in these policies and the 
army, in that sense, can not be completely left out of the 
economic side of the situation. On the contrary, as I shall 
go into details in the forecoming pages of this section, the 
military played an active role by making some basic reforms 
in economic management during its rule between 1960 - 1961. 
Furthermore, I argue that economy and political power are 
the two notions that can not be thought of one without the 
other since they are very much interrelated.
The Turkish armed forces intervened on 12 September 
1980 because the Turkish state was on the verge of falling 
apart. A summary statement of the factors which impelled
99
the military to act was included in the very first speech
issued on the morning of the coup:
The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity 
of the country, to provide for national unity and 
fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility 
of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish 
the existence and the authority of the state, and to 
eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working 
of the democratic order.
Therefore the goals of this coup, as outlined by 
General Kenan Evren were as follows: 1) to maintain the 
national unity; 2) to restore security of life and property by 
preventing anarchy and terrorism; 3) to ensure and to 
protect the primacy of state authority ; 4) to secure social 
peace, social justice, individual rights and freedoms and 
human rights; 5) to restore economic growth and stability;
6) finally, after concluding the legal arrangements, to 
reinstate the civil administration within a reasonable time. 
As always, the light which will direct the nation in attaining 
the above mentioned goals will consist of Ataturkism and its
227principles.
The most significant aspect of the 1980 takeover was 
the lack of identification with any specific civilian or 
bureaucratic group. Under the m ilitary’s plan for governing 
the country, the basic decisions were made by the National
^^®Tachau, “Democracy” , 24
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Security Council (NSC), which included the Chief of the 
General Staff, Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force, and Secretary General of the Council.
One of the first acts of the m ilitary rulers was to 
revive the doctrine of Atatiirkism , which had always been 
the salient ideology of the military, and make it the basis of 
the regime. To put it in the simplest terms, Atatiirkism  rests 
on the ideal that Turkey is a nation-state and that its form 
of government is republican.
When the military intervened on 12 September 1980 
the aim of the military was to replace the malfunctioning 
democracy of the pre-1980 period with a completely new 
democratic system which would not leave any space for the 
degeneration of the political system. Alfred Stepan calls the 
m ilitary ’s internal institutional response to society’s 
problems, whether in the realm of internal national security 
or balance of payments the “new professionalism ”; “The 
new professionals... had constructed the correct doctrines 
of national security and development, possessed the
Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian 
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trained cadres to implement these doctrines, and had the 
institutional force to impose their solution to the crisis.
The military intervention of 12 September 1980 had 
legitimized itself when Evren made a short broadcast at 
04:00 hours announcing that the armed forces had ‘invoked 
the power granted to them by the internal Service Code to 
protect and look after the Turkish Republic’ . This was 
followed by a longer broadcast at 13.00 hours in which 
Evren justified the takeover by referring to the civilian 
governments’ failure to quell the preceding terrorism. The 
aim of the operation was to safeguard the integrity of the 
country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to 
prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and to 
re-establish the existence and the authority of the state.
One of the most important problems facing these 
m ilitary regimes which undermines their ability to stay in 
power is the problem of legitimacy. Quoting from Rouquie, 
Barkey states: “the doctrine of ‘national security’ which in 
one from or another is shared by these institutionalized 
m ilitary governments provides a discourse or language that 
serves temporarily to disguise their illegitimacy, but it is
Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal 
Warfare and Military Role Expansion", in Authoritarian Brazil. Alfred 
Stepan (ed.), (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), 58
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incapable of generating a new and permanent source of 
l e g i t i m a c y . T h i s  is because authoritarian regimes are 
devoid of any overarching ideology to help them organize 
and lead society. The main impediment to the institu tionali­
zation of military regimes remains the fact that society 
traditionally ascribes legitimacy to governments elected 
through normal democratic procedures. In the Turkish case, 
the conflicting demands of professionalism and domestic 
politics increases the pressure on the Turkish m ilitary to
233disengage from politics.
The military regime’s first task was to end the political 
violence which had preceded the coup. Accordingly, in the 
first days following the 1980 coup, while suspected 
terrorists and other opponents were sought and jailed, 
various public offices and institutions were taken over by 
officers. In addition, political parties and parliament were 
suspended, the necessary amendments were made in the 
Martial Law Act, to give Martial law commanders enhanced 
powers. These amendments included the right to ban 
strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend 
newspapers and other publications, and to dismiss local
Henri Barkey, “Why Military Regimes Fail; The Perils to 
Transition” , Armed Forces and Society. 16: 2, Winter 1990, 171
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and central government s t a f f . T h e r e f o r e ,  the NSC took 
the complete responsibility of ruling the country.
One of the other main tasks of Evren and his colleagues 
was to appoint a civilian cabinet which would carry on the 
day-to-day administration of the country, under the junta. 
The jun ta ’s initial intention was to form a cabinet from 
cooperative members of the former parliament and its first 
choice for the premiership was Turhan Feyzioğlu, leader of 
the Republican Reliance party. However, the generals 
eventually decided that since Feyzioğlu commanded the 
support of only a few MPs, he would hardly be an acceptable 
premier in the eyes of the public. Eventually, the council 
chose a new candidate for the premiership in the person of 
ex-Admiral Bülent Ulusu, who had retired as commander of 
the navy the previous August. Ulusu had the advantage of 
Service Seniority, as well as the fact that he had been 
closely involved in preparations for the coup before his 
retirement from the navy. Plus he was also close to the 
thinking of Evren and the other commanders.
Ulusu announced his cabinet on 21 Septem ber and 
contained twenty-seven members, all of whom were
Hale, “M ilitary” , 251 
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non- party technocrats. Apart from Ulusu himself, five of the 
ministers were retired m ilitary men. Among the other 
ministers, the only one who was well known to the public 
was Turgut Ozal, who was given the responsibility for 
economic affairs as deputy prime minister. Ozal continued 
the economic programme which he had begun during the 
last Demirel administration. He was largely critisized by 
RPP supporters for having ‘Demirel’s programme without 
Demirel.
According to Hale, the coup was received by the 
public with general relief and life throughout Turkey had 
returned to an unaccustomed calm in a very short period of 
time. All the leaders of the four main political parties were 
interned right away except for Turke§, who evaded arrest 
until 14 S e p t e m b e r . D e m i r e l  and Ecevit’s internment at 
Gallipoli ended on 11 October 1980 when they were 
released. However, NAP was accused of a number of 
charges. NSP was also accused of illegally subverting the 
secular nature of the Republic and later Erbakan was 
released on the condition of waiting trial.
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Ecevit resigned from the chairmanship of RPP on 30 
October 1980 and started to write articles highly critical of 
the military regime of 1980 as the editor of “A rayış” 
(“Search”). Demirel remained out of the political stage and 
waited for the transition to civilian politics. He did not hide 
his opposition to the generals and all their works in his 
private discussions. In the meantime, Ecevit was arrested 
twice for the violarion of the decree issued on June 2, 1981, 
which stipulated that: “former politicians are forbidden to 
make any statements about the past or future political or 
legal system of T u r k e y . L a t e r  on, a ban on the old 
political leaders re-entering politics was formally issued in 
October 1982, when Provisional Article -  4 of the new 
constitution decreed that: “the chairmen, general 
secretaries, and other senior office holders in the former 
political parties could not join or have ‘any kind of relations’ 
with future political parties, or run for election (even as 
independents) for the next ten years.
The main reason for closing the political parties and 
banning the old political leaders from politics was due to 
the fact that Evren believed that a clean break with the past 
was definitely needed. Unlike Erbakan and Türkeş, Demirel
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and Ecevit could not be charged with any crime for their 
actions before 12 September, and the generals were aware 
of the danger of making martyrs of them, as had happened 
to Adnan Menderes.
Although there were certain sim ilarities between 1960 
and 1980 military interventions, such that the m ilitary held 
power on its own and governed through a civilian cabinet of 
technocrats, there were also three important differences 
which kept the solidarity and stability of the regime. In the 
first place, in 1980 intervention there was no breakdown of 
the hierarchy within the armed forces. The previous military 
commanders did not have to be removed, as Rüştü 
Erdeihun had been, and there was no post-coup purge of 
the officer corps. Instead, NSC was simply purged of its 
civilian members, and carried on as the new source of the 
power. “The regime thus represented the collective will of 
the high command, rather than of particular m ilitary groups 
with a top dressing of senior generals, as had happened in
1960. I I 242
Secondly, in 1980, the middle-ranking officers did not 
play any independent part in bringing the coup about. 
Although there may have been some divisions of opinion
"^’ Ibid., 261 
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within the armed forces, they were never strong enough to 
break the surface and there were no radicals to challenge 
the authority of the junta. The power was far more 
centralized than it had been on the earlier occasion.
Thirdly, there was no division between the military 
rulers and the active commanders of the forces. And there 
was no repetition of the dangerous clash between the 
m ilitary rulers and the serving force commanders which had 
occurred in 1961. Hale points out that in Evren’s memories, 
he admits that things might have gone badly wrong if there 
had been disputes within the NSC, “but, on the contrary, 
there was not even the slightest disagreement among us.’’ '^*^
The military was also very much sensitive on the 
issue of politicization of the bureaucratic intelligentsia and 
universities. From September 1980 to September 1981 a 
total of 18.000 civil servants were either taken into custody, 
or formally arrested, or convicted. Also, there were signs 
that large-scale purges were in prospect for civil 
bureaucrats, whose previous appointments had been 
carrying political connotations.
The Higher Education Council (Yüksek öğretim  Kurulu 
-YÖ K), was set up on 6 November 1981 in order to control
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and restrict the autonomy of the universities by the military 
since they had been the most politically activated sectors of 
Turkish society during the 1970s. Both students and staffs 
of universities were forbidden to join political parties. The 
Council was also the supervisor of the administration of the 
universities, including such areas as staffing and admissions. 
In 1982, about three hundred academicians were dismissed 
and dismissals continued throughout 1983.
In 1981, the military appointed a Consultative Assembly 
for devising a new constitution and a new electoral law. In a 
referendum, held in November 1982, the new document was 
submitted to the people with a compulsory participation, 
which resulted in its approval by an overwhelming ninety- 
one per cent. The new electoral law aimed at the creation 
of new political parties, which will prepare the path for a 
smooth transition to civilian politics once more. And the 
1982 Constitution would be the guarantee for the w ith­
drawal of the military from the political scene of the country 
as an active participant.
Nevertheless, today the military in Turkey still keeps 
a watchful eye on the civilian government to ensure it does 
not, once again, stray toward the ineffectualism and 
factionalism that provoked the 1980 intervention. The 
bottom line is that the Turkish military is a reluctant
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participant, ensuring that intervention need not occur in the
future 245
3.2. The M ilitary’s Role in the Turkish Economy
According to Eric Nordlinger, there are three models 
or patterns of political involvement of the m ilitary which he 
suggests in his book called Soldiers in Politics : Military 
C o u p s  and Governments. I n  his first model, the m ilitary 
act as “moderators’ and they rather use “veto power” from
behind scenes. The goals of the military in this model: “ .....
to preserve the status quo, maintaining the balance (or 
imbalance) of power among the contending groups, enforcing 
the political and constitutional ground rules, staving of 
practically any kind of important change in the distribution 
of economic rewards, and ensuring political order and 
governmental stability.^'*^
In the second model which is named as “The Guardian 
Regime” military guardians are essentially sim ilar to 
moderators except that they feel it necessary to displace 
the civilian government. “Their goals may include the
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removal of squabbling, corrupt, and excessively partisan
politic ians......  Basically, they intend to correct what are
seen to be malpractices and deficiencies of the previous 
government.” '^*®
In his third model, this type of regime, “The Ruler 
Type” , has as its goal not only control, but often basic 
changes in significant aspects of the political, economic 
and even social system. The polity, society and economy 
are to be penetrated from above. The Kemalist regime has 
some important features fitting into this model.
Although all military regimes promise to retire from 
power once their goals are achieved. The Ruler Types, 
however, are likely to stay in place for a much more 
extended period of time.^®° They would like to retain the 
control of the economy since economy and political power 
is interrelated. Thus, the military and economic relations 
should be more closely examined. Especially the m ilitary’s 
economic difficulties during the Menderes period from 1950 
to 1960, which led to the introduction of some reforms in 
economic management during 1960 and 1961 have to be 
reviewed.
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According to Hale, the beginning of the army’s role in 
Turkish economy as an active player first started with the 
reforms in economic management introduced by the military 
regime of 1960-1961 Before the intervention, the political 
détente was accompanied by an important degree of economic 
integration between the army and the civilian regime.During 
the 1960s, the government was anxious to ensure that army 
officers received good pay and conditions, so that some of 
the economic discontents, which had accelerated the 27 
May coup would be removed.
Throughout the history, the Turkish military has always 
been an elite group;that is to say,well educated and organized 
social group moving into the higher spectrums of the Turkish 
history. They are the defenders of the nation from external 
enemies and ready to sacrifice themselves for the protection 
of the Republic. Their professionalism is also accompanied 
by feelings of high honour as well as discipline and uniformity 
emerging from the hierarchical basis of the institution. Who 
could possibly permit to lose the m ilitary’s such prestige in 
the eyes of the public? Or who could possibly even dare to 
attempt to put military in such a situation?
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Although in each intervention of the military into 
politics since 1960, their foremost concern has seemed to 
be the restructuring of the political system, their actual 
primal task was to straighten the economic situation of the 
country including the m ilitary’s economy in that political 
system. As Hale points out: “the economic chaos... taken by 
itse lf might have been enough to bring about a political 
c o l l a p s e . H e  also argues that among the two basic 
causes of the collapse, economic and social, the firs t one is 
distinguished by a mounting economic crisis.
In 1961, in an effort to improve the economic lot of 
retired officers, the NUC regime had instituted an Armed 
Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (known as OYAK). Ten per 
cent of the salaries of all serving officers and civilian 
employees of the Ministry of Defense were paid into the 
fund which then invested in productive enterprises. OYAK 
used the proceeds to provide benefits to the subscribers -  
primarily pensions, but also low-cost mortgages and 
subsidized consumer goods which could be bought at 
special Army Markets.
OYAK rapidly became a fairly important source of 
investment funds for the private sector. By 1972, its total
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assets were estimated at US$ 300 million, spread over an 
impressive list of industrial and other enterprises. These 
included controlling interests in a food canning company, 
the OYAK insurance company, the Çukurova cement plant 
and a truck and tractor factory. OYAK had substantial 
interests in the OYAK-Renault car plant and in the chemical 
tyre and petroleum industries together with hotels and real 
estate investments. Although OYAK and the companies are 
run by civilian technocrats, the retired army officers have 
tended to occupy key directoral posts. OYAK’s General 
Committee included the Ministers of Defense and Finance, 
the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the 
four armed forces. Radical critics of the regime, as Hale 
argues, began to speak of a ‘m ilitary-industrial establishment’ 
in Turkey.
After the economic reforms of military regime of 1960- 
61, the GNP was more than doubled between 1960 and 
1973. Turkey moved out of the stage of a simple agricultural 
economy and became semi-industrialised country with the 
steady growth of the industrial sector. In addition, inflation 
was held to an average of around 8 per cent per year. During 
the 1950s, the m ilitary’s defense expenditures did not fall 
consistently as a percentage of a generally rising GNP. In 
fact. Hale argues that the Democrats continued to sacrifice
256 Ibid., 174
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a significant fraction of potential economic growth to main­
tain Turkey’s military strength. Nevertheless, most of the 
officers were not happy with their salaries and living 
standards during Menderes regime. They were suffering 
from low income rates which failed to keep up with the high 
inflation rate of approximately 16 per cent during 1956 and 
1959. He also argues that many officers were in fact 
convinced that the government was deliberately starving 
the army of resources causing a high loss of prestige in the 
eyes of the p u b l i c . B o t h  1961 and 1980 m ilitary coups 
were motivated by the Turkish army’s concerns over various 
governments’ economic policies.
After the 1980 military intervention, the military 
regime’s overall record in economy was a distinct 
improvement when compared to disastrous conditions of 
1978-80. Ozal was appointed as the chief economic tsar 
and he was given a fairly free hand by the generals to 
continue his policies begun in January 1980. The inflation 
rate fell from 107 per cent in 1980 to 37 per cent in 1983, 
GNP rose by around 4 per cent per year in 1981 and 1982 
and 3.3 per cent in 1983 with an annual population growth 
rate of about 2.3 per cent. With the improvement in foreign 
trade and the restoration of law and order, the economy
257 Ibid., 99
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moved back into growth.^®® However,the real wages between 
the start of 1981 and the end of 1983 remained stable in 
the public sector and rose slightly in the private sector. The 
most consistent charge against the military regime’s economic 
policies was that the ban on strikes brought about a serious 
erosion in the living standards of industrial workers.^®®
A major crisis hit Turkish economy in 1982 with the 
Kastelli scandal. The military regime’s greatest economic 
failure came by the bankers’ crisis. Cevher özden, a.k.a. 
‘Banker Kastelli’ , was collecting thousands of people’s 
entire savings in his high-yield bonds, and making promises 
to pay high interests in return. On 20 June 1982, when the 
Kastelli’s firm collapsed, it left behind 220,000 investors. 
The government, in response, stocked about 8 billion 
Turkish Lira into the banks in order to prevent a possible 
general panic. This restored some degree of stability to the 
system but caused ö z a l’s resignation from the cabinet 
together with Şerif Tüten, the Minister of Housing. In 
addition, then Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu withdrew Kaya 
Erdem, the Minister of Finance and replaced him with 
Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu. This incident put the blame of the 
crash on Kaya Erdem, the Minister of Finance. Nevertheless,
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the bankers’ crisis did not bring any major changes in 
economic strategy and the m ilitary government did not 
reserve its general commitment to free-market policies, 
in its lifetime.
In the economic sphere, although the economy was 
back on track, the Kastelli crash caused serious losses to 
thousands of investors and this could have been prevented 
by more cautious economic policies of the government. As 
for the trade unions, they were forced to pay a heavy price 
in order to restructure the economy by the loss in their real 
wages during the military regime.
Since a large part of military spending is devoted to 
technologically highly advanced projects and because of its 
limited relevance in a developing economy it could not be 
considered as of social benefit and the arguments for the 
social value of military expenditure ignore the gains which 
could have been achieved if the same resources had been 
devoted directly to civilian economy. The military has rather 
protected and promoted its own corporate and self interests. 
Quoting from Frederic Shorter, Hale cites an example such 
that in Turkey between 1948 and 1960 only one per cent of 
the expenditure on highway development was made by the
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military establishment. The social benefits of m ilitary may 
be overestimated even if the m ilitary spendings have 
occurred in less-sophisticated fields.
To sum up, the role of army as an economic actor 
stresses the role of OYAK, the Armed Forces Mutual 
Assistance Fund, integrating in the m ilitary into emergent 
capitalism. Corporatism has played an important role in 
successful interventions. “ In both 1960 and 1980, military 
regimes seized the chance to secure increased salaries and 
fringe benefits for the officer corps, which now enjoys a 
high standard of living, compared with that of most citizens. 
It is argued that this helps to explain why military regimes 
have acquired a more conservative bent since 1960.” ®^'’
At the end of 1979; a report was presented by Turgut 
Ozal to Prime Minister Demirel. The contents and the main 
discussion of this report is quite explanatory to make us 
see that how 24January1980 economic measures are inter­
related with 1980 military coup.Ozal’s views in this report are 
quite sufficient to underline the one real-fact that the actual 
reasons of 1980 military intervention is not political but
rather economic. 265
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On the other hand, the political and social concerns of 
military have been more important than their corporate 
interests. For example, William Hale emphasizes the social 
context for an explanation of the dominance of the more 
conservative group within the military.He takes Huntington’s 
suggestion to explain the situation: in societies where the 
civilian political institutions become stronger armies 
become also more conservative. “ In the world of oligarchy, 
the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a 
participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the 
horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing 
o r d e r . I n  Turkish context, the military once accounted for 
a high proportion of the educated middle-class, its position 
is challenged by the rise of a far bigger civilian elite of 
businessman and professionals. At the same time, the 
army’s relationship with the state bureaucrats has also 
been crucial. As Metin Heper quotes, “politicization of the 
civil service by successive governments during the 1970s 
reduced the civil bureaucracy to a secondary position, so 
that the military came to act as the dominant partner in the
state elite »267
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CHAPTER IV
RESTRUCTURING OF TURKISH ECONOMY AND 
ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
4.1 The January 24, 1980 Stabilization Measures
In the previous chapters, I have already dealt with 
ISI-induced inward oriented economic policies and a 
detailed analysis of the crisis of import substitution in the 
late 1970s has already been made.
In the foregoing pages of this chapter I will analyze 
the January 24, 1980 stabilization measures which were 
aimed to build up the Turkish economy by restoring price 
stability and achieving viable growth. From an economic 
standpoint, 1980 was the beginning of the transformation of 
Turkey’s political economy from ISI-inspired attitudes and 
structures to a more dynamic and open system. Thus, 
export promotion (EP), rather than import substitution 
industrialization was to be the main target. The libera li­
zation episode that began in January 1980 marks a turning 
point in Turkish economic history. For the first time in its 
recent history, the country aimed explicitly at making the 
economy more ‘market-oriented’ .
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The single most important feature of any reform 
programme is that it be credible. The government’s 
commitment will depend on pre-reform conditions, notably 
political stability of the state of the m a c ro e co n o m y .S in ce  
the new governments are not tarnished with the failures of 
previous governments, they are more likely to be able to 
enforce credibility. They are also better able to withstand 
the opposition to reforms, from bureaucrats and public 
employees who are losing influence and from those who 
had earned rents in protected activities.
On January 24,1980 the Demirel government announced 
a major stabilization and liberalization programme which 
represented a radical move from past policies and practices. 
With the new program, the government abandoned the 
inward-oriented, import substitution guided political economy 
in favor of an export driven one.
The short-term goal of the programme was to stabilize 
inflation and cope with the balance of payments problem, 
the long-term goal was to liberalize and restructure the 
Turkish economy.Almost eight months after the promulgation 
of the January 24 measures which announced the end of 
fifty  years of protectionism, the military intervened on
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September 12, 1980.Thus, it was the new military regime 
which regained the state’s autonomy with the beginning of a 
period of far-reaching structural changes leading to a 
market e c o n o m y . T h e  government’s desire to restructure 
the economy starting from the early 1980s caused political 
repression. In other words, political repression of 1980s, 
which resulted in frustration and instability because of the 
distortion of income distribution is motivated by the 
government’s desire to rebuild the Turkish economy.
According to M.Müftüler, although the other exigencies 
which impinge upon Turkish policy-making are not denied, 
the economic reforms of 24 January 1980 stabilization 
measures should be seen as an attempt to adapt to the 
newly emerging system in Europe. And the ultimate aim of 
these reforms was to have compatibility with the standards 
of the Eralp also argues that Turkey’s relations with
Europe have always been an important political issue in 
Turkey. Turkey’s main problem in this respect has been 
whether Turkey should identify itself with Europe or the
Middle East. 272
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The success of the January 24, 1980 measures 
depended on three crucial constituents. First one was 
rescheduling of Turkey’s debt, second, the cooperation of 
the various domestic groups and third, time for results to 
develop rapidly.Creditors such as commercial banks and 
other governmental institutions were not extending new 
loans and credits to Turkey without the IMF and World 
Bank’s approval. Rescheduling of debts was necessary to 
stimulate the foreign trade sector and resume the inflow of 
new money into Turkey.Turkish government needed to 
convince the international lending agencies of the seriousness 
with which it approached this task.^^^
The architect of these stabilization measures was 
Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983-1989, 
and the President from 1989 until his death in April 1993. 
Ozal, in early 1980, was the chief of SPO and Demirel’s 
chief economic tsar. He argued that the consequences of 
not adopting the proposed measures would cause the 
inflation rate to surpass the 120 per cent mark and would 
also cause the unemployment rate to reach unbearable 
levels. In addition, the deteriorating economic conditions 
would make worse the already intolerable levels of anarchy 
and terrorism. He also stated that, “the problems facing the 
country can not be resolved with short-term temporary
273 Barkey, “Turkey”, 174
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measures. Only a program, such as the one announced on 
January 24, with an anticipated implementation duration of 
five years, can do the job of opening up the economy to 
foreign competition, and encourage exports.
A trade system is called neutral, if it operates under 
perfect competition as it would in the absence of government 
interference. Any movement in a trade regime towards 
neutrality is defined as trade liberalization, and a change 
which increases the deviation from neutrality is seen as 
reversal of liberalization.Reversal of liberalization increases 
government interference in trade.There are three manifestations 
of trade liberalization. The first; it is a move from rationing 
through government regulation to the use of price mechanisms 
in the form of tariffs. Second, a move towards neutrality 
lowers the average levels of nominal and effective protection 
and subsidy rates and reduces the dispensions within the 
system of these rates. The third manifestation of trade 
liberalization is a move towards a system where the real 
exchange rate remain relatively stable over time with no 
fluctuations.^^®
The principle objective of trade liberalization is to 
facilitate the growth of real imports. A realistic exchange
Ibid., 177
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rate is a first step in the liberalization process. Reducing 
protection, and so remaining many price distortions will 
encourage exports as it reduces the input costs facing 
exporters and discourages resources from going into 
import-competing industries.
The stabilization measures were of basically two 
kinds: the first kind, were those which could be introduced 
through government edicts and regulations such as 
exchange rate determination and the second kind, were 
those which required parliamentary approval such as tax 
reform. The first measure which was announced on January 
24, 1980 was a devaluation of the Lira by almost 49 per 
cent from 47.10 TL to the dollar to 70 TL. The overvalued 
exchange rate of Turkish Lira was causing an additional 
inflation to catch-up with the real prices of the imported 
goods. Therefore, Turkish Lira was devaluated in order to 
draw it back to its real parity. The size of the devaluation 
was unexpected and it even surpassed IMF standards. 
Devaluation of the Lira was the first step in what was hoped 
would develop into a system of flexible exchange rates. The 
constant adjustment of the currency through periodic mini­
devaluations was the first and foremost requirement of the
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stand-by agreement signed by the government with the IMF. 
The assumption was tha t,“ rolling back the real consequences 
of an undervalued exchange rate by creating extra inflation 
is less costly than repairing the consequences of an over­
valued exchange rate by contractionary policies.
In May 1981, the policy-makers institutionalized the 
policy of broad maintenance of an unchanged real effective 
exchange rate through daily changes in the nominal rate.
Table -  3 Real Exchange Rates 1979-91 Annual Averages279
Year Annual Average 
Rate
Nominal 
Rate (TL
1979 156.9 31.1
1980 109.1 76.0
1981 104.3 111.2
1982 107.8 162.6
1983 103.0 225.5
1984 96.7 366.7
1985 97.3 522.0
1986 87.2 674.5
1987 82.1 857.2
1988 104.2 1,422.4
1989 108.3 2,121.7
1990 114.6 2,608.6
1991 111.9 4,169.9
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Since the main purpose was to make Turkish Lira a fully 
convertible currency, one step would be to ensure the 
competitiveness of Turkish Lira by keeping the depreciation 
of the exchange rate continuously against convertible 
currencies. Müftüler argues that Turkish Lira was prepared 
for financial integration by finding its real value instead of 
overvalued exchange rates of the 1970s. “The aim is to 
have an increasing degree of convertibility of the Turkish 
Lira for an ever increasing degree of monetary integration 
with the EC.” ®^° The interest rates which were fixed by 
administrative decisions until 1980 were freed and 
rationalized. The higher interest rates were assumed to 
encourage savings.
ô z a l’s new economic program included following 
priorities other than combat inflation: increase foreign 
currency receipts, increase exports, eliminate black market 
operations and scarcities, speed up investment decisions 
which would increase employment, and improve the distribution 
of income to end what he called the ‘disappearance of the 
middle class’. H e  presented the package to the nation as 
measures of the ‘ last resort’ .
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Müftüler also enumerates the objectives of the January 24, 
1980 stabilization measures as follows: 1) to cope with the 
immediate pressures on the payment deficits, 2) to eliminate 
the destruction of equilibrium in major markets, 3) to break 
the inflationary spiral, reduce inflation and provide price 
stability, 4) to privatize the state enterprises and, 5) to 
liberalize foreign trade and payments as a part of the
efforts to shift to a sustainable balance of payments
282position.
Since Özal’s rhetoric was based on the promise of a 
Turkish economy capable of selling its goods all over the 
world government policies in the first years after the
adoption of the new strategy favoured exporters 283
The fiscal incentives provided to exporters during the 
1980s included: export rate rebates; cash grants, 
financed by the ‘Support and Price Stabilization 
Fund’; duty-free imports of intermediates and raw 
materials; exemption from the production tax which 
was replaced later by exemption from value added 
tax; rebates from the ‘Resource Utilization Support 
Fund’; exemption from various taxes related to 
alternative export transactions, and exemptions from 
freight rates.^ ^
Import regulations and laws, governing the entry of 
foreign capital were liberalized in order to revise the foreign 
trade sector. One of the other revisions in the foreign trade
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sector included export incentives in the form of credits or 
foreign exchange to exporters. The purpose of the outward 
-and market -  oriented economic transformation was 
depended on policies such as to restrain the growth of 
domestic demand and on structural reforms to increase 
supply through an improved allocation of resources. Price 
control mechanisms, government subsidies, state investments 
and economic policies that reduce or eliminate restrictions 
on foreign trade sector were a d o p t e d . L a v i s h  grants of 
credits and tax advantages (in the form of tax exemptions 
and rebates) resulted in the increase of numbers of 
exporters, many of whom had been, in the past, producers 
for international market.
On the domestic front, price control mechanisms were 
abolished together with some of the selected subsidies. In 
order to close the gap in State Economic Enterprises’ 
budgets the prices of public sector products were repeatedly 
increased by significant amounts.Another significant measure, 
which was put in the January package and realized on July 1, 
1980 was the freeing of domestic interest rates.
The import regime which remained in force until the 
1980s was partly phased out in 1981 and a major reform in
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January 1984 was introduced when all imports were 
classified into three lists. They were: the ‘prohibited lis t’ , 
‘ imports subject to permission lis t’ and, ‘ liberalized lis t’ . 
Commodities that could not be imported under any circum­
stances such as arms were specified in the ‘prohibited lis t’ . 
‘ Imports subject to permission lis t’ specified the items that 
could be imported with prior official permission and the 
‘liberalized lis t’ contained the commodities that could freely 
be imported.
At the time of the import system reform, the government 
introduced with the value added tax (VAT), which applied to 
almost all commodities and cancelled the production tax, 
which applied to domestic production and import of certain 
commodities. Moreover, it imposed also another new 
surcharge, the ‘housing fund tax’ , on some imports to 
finance housing construction for poor and middle- income 
families. In addition ‘support and price stabilization fund 
tax’ , and ‘resource utilization support fund tax ’ were 
imposed.
During the 1980s, imports were subject to tariffs and 
several tariff-like charges: the municipality tax, transportation 
infrastructure tax, mining fund tax, stamp duty, value added
287 Togan and Balasubramanyam, "Liberalization”, 11
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tax, housing fund tax, resource utilization and support fund 
tax and, support and price stabilization fund tax.^ ®®
One of the other motives behind the economic reforms 
of the 1980s was explained by Ozal in his speech, in the 
Turkish Parliament on 13 April 1987. He stated as: “the aim 
of the economic liberalization programme and our reforms 
was to facilitate our integration into the European Community 
as a full member.’’ ®^®
The European financial integration through the 
establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU) and 
European Central Bank had been another economic motive 
for Turkey. Because the objective of monetary integration 
within the EMU requires the solution of structural problems, 
the convertibility of the Turkish Lira, the reduction of the 
inflation rate to the average inflation rate of the EC and the 
adjustment of macro-economic policies.^®®
Barkey argues that the package, which was designed 
to streamline the economy and specifically to adverse 
reaction by deepening the existing recession. “Domestic 
demand was reduced by adhering to IMF prescriptions of a 
tight monetary policy.The credit squeeze added to inventories
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and seriously endangered mid-sized manufacturing concerns 
which did not enjoy ready access to funds from privately 
owned b a n k s . D e s p i t e  the larger banks’ attempts to 
negotiate a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ to prevent the practice 
of paying unofficial premiums to large depositors, the 
interest rates continued to climb from an average of 12 per 
cent in January 1980 to over 40 per cent in June 1981.
As the difficulties associated with export promotion 
began to be more widely felt, those who had welcomed the 
1980 measure became critical of the existing export 
promotion policy and began to argue that EP and ISI were 
not mutually exclusive strategies.Industrialists demanded 
more stable protection for industry and asked for export 
subsidies to be extended to producers rather than 
e x p o r t e r s . E r a l p  argues that the Ozal governments had 
not been able to deliver two of their basic promises: to keep 
inflation under control and to ensure exports earning large 
enough to cover Turkey’s import bill.^®'*
Allthough the export orientation of the new regime did 
quite well in areas such as foreign trade and export
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performance, it caused a further increase in Turkey’s debt
and a decline in real wage rates.
......... this transformation has exacted a price; it has
come at the expense of further indebtedness and 
consistently declining real wage rates. The Turkish 
foreign debt increased by 2.5 times since 1980. Even 
more alarming for Turkey had been the changing 
nature of the foreign debt as short-term debt which 
had been reduced from 25 per cent of the total in 
1979, to 15 per cent in 1980, and then to 10 per cent 
in 1982, starting to rise in 1984 and reaching almost 
23 per cent in 1987. In the long run, and especially in 
new of the problems faced by the large debtor nations 
of Latin America, the over- dependence on short- term 
financing can potentially lead to the crisis of 
confidence, crises characteristics of the 1970s. 
Moreover, the decline in real wages since 1979 by 
almost 30 to 50 per cent for private and public 
sectors’ employees had not been accompanied by 
significant improvements in the unemployment 
picture...
Togan argues that Turkey liberalized its import and 
export regimes successfully during the 1980s. But still 
exists anti-export bias in the economy, and the real 
exchange rate must depreciate over time in order to reduce
the trade deficit in the long run. 296
A simplification of the ta riff and subsidy system is 
desirable and should be more transparent. The rates of 
protection and subsidy could be further lowered as well and 
frequent alterations in tariff and subsidy rates cause
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uncertainty for importers and exporters creating unnecessary 
difficulties in planning for future production.
4.2 Political Implications
From a political perspective, the January 24, 1980 
program gained momentum with the military coup of 
September 12, 1980. In the first months of 1980, despite 
the initial positive results and the international lending 
agency support for the measures, the implementation of 
January 24 measures was slowed down by the parliamentary 
deadlock that reached its peak over the issue of the election 
of a new president for the Turkish Republic. In view of past 
governments’ large budget deficits, tax reform legislation 
was needed first to raise additional revenues, and second 
to relieve pressure on the salaried classes. These hurdles 
were partly overcome after the military intervention. In fact, 
in the immediate aftermath of the 1980 military takeover, 
Ozal’s first recommendation to the new leaders was to 
implement the tax re fo rm ."”
The political leaders of the post-military coup era, the 
military and the industrialists constituted a new rhetoric and 
agreed that for the resolution of the economic crisis of the
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1970s the economy had to be depoliticised. The new rhetoric 
was based on a demand to increase the state’s role in 
issues of law and order, paralleled by a reduction of state 
intervention in the economy. But in the end, a wide gap 
occurred between this rhetoric and the actual measures 
adopted. The Turkish electorate began to be transformed 
from ‘hom opoliticus’ to ‘homoeconomicus’ .^ ^^  Consequently 
in the latter part of the 1980s the economic issues has 
turned into political issues in Turkey. “Turkey’s application 
to the European Community for full membership is the 
indicative of the way in which economic issues have once 
again led to political controversy in the late 1 9 8 0 s . S i n c e  
Turkey has been caught between the dilemma whether 
Turks should orient themselves towards Western or Islamic 
culture, or whether Turkey should orient itse lf with Europe 
or the Middle East the entry, then, has become a politically
contentious issue. 301
M üftüler also argues that 24 January 1980 Economic 
measures enabled Turkish governments to pursue their 
desire to be accepted as the thirteenth member of the EC. 
The reform programme was hoped to help overcome the 
structural disparities between the European and Turkish
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economy. Turkey’s adoption of value added tax (VAT) prior 
to the m ajority of the EC countries may be regarded as a 
step to elim inate the disputes on the economic ground 
between EC and Turkey, since the Turkish VAT Legislation 
was prepared with respect to the laws and regulations of 
the EC, even though Turkey is not a full member.^“
In the domestic front, the export-oriented policies 
exacerbated the conflicts between small and large capitals 
and favoured the large ones. While holding companies 
could move more easily toward producing export with their 
diversified activities, whereas smaller firms had been 
brought almost to the verge of bankruptcy because of high 
interest rates. High interest rates had resulted in a credit 
squeeze since increased costs and higher prices meant 
losing their customers who had reduced purchasing power 
as a result of austerity measures. One of the ways that 
these large firms found to get rid of the problem of tight 
credit was through establishing their own banks. The 
number of these banks greatly increased after the 1980s.^°^ 
Other than shortages of credit which were created by 
the policies of export orientation there were also problems 
associated with the process of exporting such as
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in frastructura l problems. These problems in Turkey made 
the process of exporting an extremely d ifficu lt one.^°'* When 
the d ifficu l-ties associated with export-oriented policies 
began to be more widely felt, those who in itia lly appreciated 
the 1980 austerity measures started to criticise the existing 
export promotion policies and argued that EP and ISI were 
not mutually exclusive strategies. Industria lists ’ criticism 
was based on a crucial issue of ‘protectionism ’. They 
demanded more state protection for industry and asked for 
export subsidies to be extended to producers rather than 
exporters.
The seventies in Turkey, were characterized by 
political instability and one may argue that economic factors 
were crucial in explaining this political instability. Economic 
factors in that sense, have been examined under two 
subtitles: the firs t is import substitution industrialisation and 
its insufficiency and the second is relative deprivation with 
the increase in people’s expectations and decrease in 
equity and income distribution. Unmet demands by large 
masses increases the public discontent towards their 
governm ents.These two factors have led to social 
frus tra tion  which stim ulates po litica l violence and
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aggression. Consequently, economic hardship and unmet 
expectations lead to increased economic marginalisation 
and alienation which hit the most to the urban poor. This in 
return provides a fertile  ground for political extremism. 
During the 1970s, especially the economic crisis as 
described in chapter two has become the most important 
factor creating the underlying causes of political instability. 
A major theory of political instability links social frustration, 
resulting from increased mobilisation of the masses, to 
political violence. This is commonly referred to as ‘Frustration 
and Aggression’ hypothesis.^®®
The stabilisation measures which were introduced on 
January 24, 1980 included economic liberalisation as well 
as an austerity package. Both of these required a major 
transform ation of the economy. Restructuring and 
transform ation of the economy is possible if the public 
supports the government despite the immediate short run 
d ifficu lties or if the government represses reactionary 
movements to its policies. Since Turkey was faced with a 
legitim acy crisis, it had problems of mobilising popular 
support for its policies and thus, the only alternative left 
was political repression, i.e. bureaucratic authoritarianism.
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This is because economic restructuring alters the distribution 
of economic benefits and in the short run, fixed income 
groups and masses almost always suffer. If the government 
fails to secure public support, it will be faced with domestic 
upheaval.
In the 1980, the government had spent a lot of effort 
to prioritise the transform ation of the economy in order to 
legitim ise its repressive policies. The economy had been 
tried to be preserved as an independent realm of desicion- 
making in order to sustain the bases of political legitimation. 
The governm ents’ inability to deliver prosperity may have 
rendered economic issues central within the present 
political agenda. Eralp argues that the m ilitary ’s and post- 
1980 governm ents’ attempts to lim it political activity to the 
regulation of the economy and constituting the economy as 
the domain of ‘experts’ , has allowed the opposition to 
politicise the economy as well as to criticise the governments’ 
poor record in establishing a liberal democracy. “The 
opposition, basically has tried to argue for a liberalisation 
in political issues to be instituted in line with a liberalisation 
in economic p o l i c i e s . E x p o r t  promotion policies have 
been criticised by the opposition for their neglect of 
industria lisation as well as for their negative effects on
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income distribution. Income distribution has become one of 
the major issues in Turkish politics at the very juncture 
when the economy had been seized upon as a means of 
effecting depolitic isation. Industria lists also kept quiet about 
the possible political consequences of inequality in income 
distribution as long as export possibilities were still open.^°®
Nevertheless, since the opposition was also influenced 
by the new strategies of export promotion, the old forms of 
state intervention in the economy were not défendable in 
any case because of the ‘ libera l’ discourse prevalent in 
Turkey.
The long term effects of the policies adopted in 1980 
were damaging political stability in Turkey in the years to 
come. Income distribution was upset; the economic benefits 
were not distributed evenly, and an increased improvisation 
of the masses, especially in urban slum areas, was the end 
result. These marginalized masses, in turn, demanded 
political participation to express their discontent and in the 
absence of stable, accessible, political institutions, these 
unmet demands for political participation prepared the 
background for political extremism as well as domestic 
unrest.
308 Ibid., 243
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CONCLUSION
The analysis of the economic background of the 
Turkish state and the state-industry relations in the late 
seventies were the primary focus of this thesis in order 
to help explain the 1980 m ilitary intervention. Although 
the economic factors and the economic crisis in the 
seventies were important factors in the 1980 m ilitary 
takeover, political matters which have deep roots in the 
political history of Turkey had never been neglected, but on 
the contrary economic factors were. So this thesis tries to 
fill this gap. The 1980 m ilitary intervention in Turkey should 
be seen as a result of a complex process of the whole web 
of historical, social, political and economic relations. Among 
these,this thesis emphasizes the role of economic relations, 
and adresses the need for a closer analysis of economic 
crisis throughout the years preceding 1980 coup d ’etat.
The thesis utilizes a model of bureaucratic authoritarianism 
and proposes that a bureaucratic authoritarian state was 
established in Turkey between1980 and 1983. A basic 
proposition is that almost all the constitutional, institutional 
and practical changes that have been implemented 
throughout these years fulfilled O’Donnell’s requisites for a
141
bureaucratic authoritarian state except for deepening 
process of import substitution industrialization. Thus, 
economic factors were argued to be effective in the rise of 
a bureaucratic authoritarian state in Turkey after 1980.
Throughout the thesis, when I combined the economic 
crisis and the crisis at the political level I have come up 
with a conclusion that politico-economic crisis were mainly 
associated with import substitution industrialization policies 
of pre-1980 coup and state-industry relations. This paved a 
way for the transformation of economic stabilisation 
measures of January 24, 1980 and then resulted in the 
m ilitary intervention of September 12, 1980.
Throughout my thesis I have also dealt with the 
notions of “state autonomy” and “guardianship of state”. The 
state autonomy was interrelated with economic crisis 
whereas m ilitary was interrelated with guardianship of 
state. The success of economic models regardless of their 
import or export orientation is mostly dependent on the 
existence of an autonomous state. Autonomous state 
means a state free of dominant class interference and is 
powerful enough to impose its own solutions on the 
economic problems. It is this autonomy which enables the 
state to avert problems and to convince the dominant 
classes and society that it is acting in their long-term 
interests. However, the absence of authority in state affairs
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in Turkey resulted in a failure to achieve the goals of 
industrialisation efforts. As the crisis deepened in Turkey, 
the state found itse lf weaker and weaker and at the final 
stage, the state authority was completely challenged.
Since the private sector in Turkey depended on the 
policies of the state from which economic rents were 
generated the tendency of the private sector to influence 
policy choices is pretty clear. With the exhaustion of the 
state economic policies and industrialisation efforts, the 
fight for maximizing economic rents increased even further 
and thus cleavages and conflict within the body of private 
sector reached its peak. Since rent maximization was 
dependent on state policies, the private cleavages and the 
fragmentation of the Turkish party system with the consequence 
of a proliferation of political parties representing different 
interest, played a crucial role both in the manipulation of 
s ta te ’s autonomy and in the exhaustion of import 
substitution. Increasing societal demands put the state 
under pressure of implementing this excession and 
rendered the state unable to implement the necessary 
initiatives to correct the economy’s inherent problems. An 
autonomous state which is well aware of its lim its and 
determined to take the necessary actions in order to 
implement import substitution policies will not let itse lf
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trapped among the different private sector groups vying for 
these economic rents, a fact that undermines its autonomy.
Throughout the history of Turkish state the m ilitary 
has always been pretended itse lf as the guardian of state 
and acted as a decision-maker. Thus, in 1980, the military, 
not so much different than in 1960, intervened as the 
guardian of state and acted as decision-maker for 
implementing its aims of being the guardian of the state 
authority. The notion of “guardianship of sta te” served as a 
protective umbrella for the m ilitary in its restructuring of the 
political system and for its involvement in economic 
management.
The notion of bureaucratic authoritarianism came in 
Turkey after a crisis situation emerged with the exhaustion 
of ISI which manifested itse lf in mainly economic issues. 
While ISI declined in its effectiveness, policy makers and 
industria lists also failed in search of new possibilities and 
patterns in economic issues. It was clearly stated in the 
thesis that ISI-induced crisis have only been resolved 
through dramatic brakes with the past and the bureaucratic 
authoritarian states are representative of this dramatic 
brake. Another outcome of the exhaustion of import 
subtitution industrialization was the legitimacy crisis 
caused by the stagnant economy and the organised mass 
mobilization of the urban lower classes and the
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intelligentsia. Thus, declining economy and mass radicalism 
prepared the stage for a m ilitary rule.
As well as the consequences of the crisis both at the 
level of economic and political, I would argue that the 
consequences of the crisis at the ideological level also 
paved the way to the formation of bureaucratic authoritarian 
state. The increase in the political mobilization of the 
popular sector and the breakdown of the relationships 
between the populist state and popular sector as a result of 
the crisis situation, created the internal shift from 
‘nationalism ’ to ‘national security ’
The legitimacy problem was one of the most important 
problems that the m ilitary regimes faced in Turkey. And it 
was a fact to undermine its ability to stay in power. The 
doctrine of ‘national security ’ provided a discourse which 
served tem porarily to disguise their legitimacy crisis. 
Therefore, the m ilitary ’s internal institutional response to 
socie ty ’s problems in the realm of internal national security 
became the main object of bureaucratic authoritarian state.
One of the other conclusions I have reached at the 
end of this thesis is that January 24, 1980 program gained 
momentum with the m ilitary coup of September 12, 1980. In 
the first months of 1980, the implementation of the measures 
was slowed down by the parliamentary deadlock over the 
issue of the election of a new president. The military
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government of post-1980 constituted a new rhetoric which 
was based on a demand to increase the state ’s role in 
issues of law and order, paralleled by a reduction of state 
intervention in the economy.
The resulting conclusion seems to be that despite all 
the emphasis on the breakdown of law and order, and the 
reign of anarchy; the Turkish state in the seventies was 
seriously threatened by its economic incapacities. A new 
economic program and an austerity package were needed 
in order to overcome the inherent problems of the economy 
and to have a liberalised economy. Both of these required a 
major transformation of the economy. Restructuring and 
transform ation of the economy is possible if there is enough 
public support for the incumbent government despite the 
immediate short run d ifficu lties or if the government 
represses reactionary movements to its policies. The 
legitim acy crisis that the Turkish state faced in these years 
prevented the adoption of necessary measures. Since 
legitimacy crisis also caused problems of mobilising popular 
support for the incumbent government’s economic policies, 
thus, the only alternative left was political repression 
through bureaucratic authoritarianism. The m ilitary rule 
from 1980 to 1983 provided a political environment that 
made these measures viable which were previously 
impossible to be adopted. This is because economic
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restructuring, as stated before, alters the distribution of 
economic benefits and in the short run it causes distresses 
especially on fixed income groups. If the government fails 
to secure public support, it will be faced with domestic 
upheaval. The m ilitary government had spent a lot of effort 
to prioritise the transform ation of the economy in order to 
legitim ise its repressive policies. The economy had been 
tried to be preserved as an independent realm of decision­
making in order to sustain the bases of political legitimation.
Despite the negative long term effects of the policies 
adopted in 1980 such as even further increased uneven 
income distribution, and further increased improvisation of 
the masses especially in urban slum areas the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state that emerged after 1980 was a response 
to mainly overcom© th© ©conomic crisis of th© s©v©nti©s.
All th©s© d©v©lopm©nts not©d in th© th©sis hav© long 
t©rm ©ff©ct on Turkish politics. Th© ongoing crisis in Turk©y 
during th© 1990s can also b© ©valuat©d in a sim ilar light; as 
an int©rplay of ©conomic and political factors.
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